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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the relationship between advanced education and the 
retention and promotion of Army officers. It uses data from the Active Duty Military 
Master File for Army officers who were commissioned between 1981 and 2001 and 
tracked until 2004, or until they separated from active duty. Results of survival analysis 
indicate that survival functions differ significantly with level of education, and that 
advanced education has a positive effect on both the retention and promotion of Army 
officers.  
Compared to an officer with a baccalaureate degree, the survival time of an 
officer with a master’s degree, a doctorate degree, or a professional degree is greater by 
29.1 percent, 23.9 percent or 8.2 percent, respectively. An officer with a master’s degree, 
a doctorate degree, or a professional degree has a hazard of leaving the Army that is 38.3 
percent, 44.4 percent, or 75.6 percent, respectively, of that of a college graduate.  
Compared to an officer with a baccalaureate degree, the length of time to 
promotion to O-4 for an officer with a master’s/doctorate degree or a professional degree 
is 0.2 percent shorter or 2.4 percent shorter, respectively. An officer with a master’s 
degree or doctorate degree has a hazard of promotion that is 115.3 percent of that of an 
officer with a college degree. Having a professional degree has no significant effect on 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Organizations always seek to hire the most qualified personnel for the jobs that 
must be done at the lowest cost. The Armed Forces, one of the biggest organizations - or 
perhaps the biggest organization - also seeks to hire and retain qualified personnel. 
According to human capital theory, education increases productivity, which is a measure 
of qualification of the employee. Thus, hiring more educated people means hiring more 
qualified personnel. 
The combat area is becoming more complicated in the 21st century, thus requiring 
more educated and qualified personnel. As a result, advanced education plays a critical 
role in shaping the combat field.  Officers shape the combat environment by assessing 
different alternatives and making critical decisions. The main duty of an officer is not to 
shoot a gun; that is the job of enlisted personnel. The main duties of an officer are to 
follow the progress of battle, assess different ways of improving the achievements gained 
in battle on behalf of the allied forces, use the advantages of terrain for friendly forces, 
and choose the best course of action and execute it. In addition, the changing combat 
environment requires using information technologies in decision-making. Education can 
improve the ability to adapt more quickly to the changing environment.1 In short, officers 
are decision-makers and decision-making requires following and analyzing the current 
situation.  
Although technology has improved so much that most weapon systems can be 
directed by robotic systems or computers, it is still the human being who decides what to 
do and tells these machines what, how and when to do it. Eventually, humans use these 
machines to decrease the workload that must be executed by people, not to do the jobs 
that are done by officers. However, working with all these complicated systems requires 
advanced education, or, at least, education increases the utilization of those complicated  
 
 
                                                 
1 Gregory A.Branigan, “The Effect of Graduate Education on the Retention and Promotion of Marine 
Corps Officers,” (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2001), 1. 
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systems. The need for and importance of highly-qualified personnel is increasing in the 
21st century. Thus, the Army itself trains and educates officers to meet those 
requirements. 
On the other hand, people themselves also make investments in education for the 
potential future returns they will yield. Employees take on three major kinds of labor 
market investments: education and training, migration and search for new jobs.2 All these 
investments require an initial cost. As with all investments, these investments are made 
with the hope of future increased returns. This thesis focuses on the education and 
training investment aspect of labor market investment. For officers, one important 
potential future payoff is to be promoted to higher ranks in the Army. For the Army, the 
future hope is to retain the qualified officers and benefit from increased productivity and 
readiness.  
A. BACKGROUND 
 There are four ways for Army officers to obtain advanced education degrees: 
• Fully funded graduate education,  
• Partially funded graduate education,  
• Unfunded graduate education and, 
• Fellowships and scholarships. 
While pursuing a graduate degree under fully or partially funded graduate 
education policy, the officer receives full pay and allowances with the majority of the 
tuition and other schooling costs paid by the officer from personal funds and/or benefits 
to which the officer is entitled. The officer attends school instead of performing usual 
military duties. Under unfunded graduate education policy, the majority of tuition and 
other schooling costs are paid by the officer from personal funds and/or benefits to which 
the officer is entitled. The officer attends school during off-duty time.  
Finally, military personnel may compete for non-military education level (non-
MEL) fellowships or scholarships designed for education or training. They may be 
                                                 
2 Ronal G.Ehrenberg, Robert S.Smith, Modern Labor Economics, Theory and Public Policy, (New 
York: Pearson Education, Inc, 2006), 275. 
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authorized to accept non-MEL fellowships or scholarships offered by eligible 
sponsors/donors for education or research in the United States or abroad. 
Officers who attend fully funded courses at civilian institutions for more than 60 
days will incur an Active Duty Service Obligation (ADSO) upon completion or 
termination of the education. The ADSO varies according to the way the degree is 
obtained, but the obligation is generally three times the length of the schooling.3 Thus, 
this service obligation increases the retention rates of officers who obtain their advanced 
degrees by utilizing one of the methods that the Army provides. Unfunded graduate 
education requires no ADSO unless the officer uses tuition assistance.  
B. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The main objective of this thesis is to examine the relationship between advanced 
education and the retention and promotion of Army officers. There are four education 
categories used for the analysis: college degree only, master's degree, doctorate degree 
and professional degree. This analysis compares promotion rates among these four 
groups. For the purpose of this thesis, the officers’ level of productivity and quality is 
measured by promotion rate. 
In addition, the survival rates of the same groups of officers are compared by 
educational level. In this thesis, one of the Army’s benefits from advanced education of 
officers is measured by retention. As a result of these comparisons, policy-makers may 
gain some insights into whether it is worthwhile to invest in different levels of advanced 
education.  
Finally, factors other than education level that might affect the retention behavior 
and promotion patterns of U.S. Army officers are also analyzed in the multivariate 
models. Those factors include gender, marital status, military occupational specialty, 
commissioning source, age at commission, race/ethnicity and prior enlisted status. 
                                                 
3 Army Regulation 350-100, Officer Active Duty Service Obligations, (Washington, DC, Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 5 May 2006), 4. 
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Although the aim of this research is not a cost-benefit analysis, this study tries to 
determine if it is worthwhile for the Army to pay for advanced education. If the 
productivity of the officers does not increase or if they are not retained long enough after 
obtaining their degrees, then it may not be worthwhile for the Army to pay for graduate 
education.  
The retention probabilities of officers with or without graduate degrees are also 
important for the Army because the officers who obtain these degrees should stay long 
enough in the Army to offset their education costs. If officers with graduate degrees leave 
the Army earlier than those without such degrees, then it may not be worthwhile for the 
Army to pay for this education. 
As explained above, the main objective of this thesis is to analyze the effect of 
advanced education on retention and promotion. Thus, based on the main objectives, 
there are two primary research questions: 
1. Does any kind of advanced education affect the retention behavior of U.S. 
Army officers? 
2. Does advanced education increase the probability of being promoted to 
MAJOR (grade of O-4)? 
The answers to these questions provide information on whether advanced 
education has a significant effect on retention behavior and promotion probabilities of 
officers. Differences among four groups of officers are considered: college graduates, 
those with master's degrees, those with doctorate degrees and professional degree 
holders. 
Beyond these two fundamental questions there are four supplementary questions 
which are addressed in this thesis. These are: 
1. What are the factors, other than education level, which affect the retention 
behavior of U.S. Army officers? 
2. What are the factors, other than education level, which affect the 
promotion of U.S. Army officers? 
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3. Are there significant differences in survival rates between officers with 
and without advanced education degrees? 
4. Are there significant differences in promotion probabilities to MAJOR (O-
4 grade) between officers with and without advanced education degrees? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The data set used for this thesis was created from the Active Duty Military Master 
File, which is supplied by the Defense Manpower Data Center. The data provide 
information about Army officers who were commissioned between 1981 and 2001. The 
officers in each cohort are tracked until 2004 or until they separate from active duty. 
Survival Analysis is used as an empirical approach in this thesis. Survival models 
are estimated both for promotion patterns and for the retention of Army officers. Three 
SAS software procedures are used for estimating survival models: PROC LIFETEST, 
PROC LIFEREG and PROC PHREG. As a result of these analyses, it is possible to 
evaluate how promotion and retention rates vary among officers with different education 
levels. 
D. LIMITATIONS 
The data set has several limitations. It does not provide information about how 
graduate degrees were obtained or from where they were obtained. Thus, in the thesis, 
officers are not distinguished by how they obtained their degrees. Moreover, they are not 
classified according to the colleges they attended.  
Other factors such as college GPA, physical training reports, performance reports, 
the quality of the college attended and rewards, were used as explanatory variables in 
some previous studies and might affect promotion and retention of U.S. Army officers. 
However, they are not available in the data set and could not be used for the analysis.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis comprises seven chapters. The first chapter is an introduction. The 
second chapter is titled “Graduate Education and Promotion Policy of the United States 
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Army.” This chapter discusses the available ways for officers to obtain graduate degrees, 
the eligibility requirements for graduate education, and service obligations related to 
graduate education. In addition, promotion policy of the U.S. Army is also explained in 
Chapter II. Chapter III provides a literature review. This chapter first briefly explains 
human capital theory, and then previous studies related to the effect of graduate 
education. Chapter IV briefly discusses the empirical method used for the analysis, which 
is survival analysis. It also explains the three SAS procedures used in this study, PROC 
LIFETEST, PROG LIFEREG and PROC PHREG. Moreover, it lists and describes the 
variables used for the analysis and the hypothesized effects of independent variables on 
retention and promotion. Chapter V is about the data and includes a preliminary data 
analysis. The structure of the data used for thesis is described in this chapter. 
Additionally, Chapter V also presents descriptive statistics. Chapter VI shows the results 
of survival analysis. The first part of this chapter presents the results for the retention 
model, and the second part gives the results of promotion analysis. The last chapter, 
Chapter VII, presents a summary of the results of the study and also provides 
recommendations. 
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II. GRADUATE EDUCATION AND PROMOTION POLICY OF 
THE UNITED STATES ARMY 
For the purpose of this thesis, graduate education is defined as studies beyond the 
bachelor’s degree or at the first professional degree level. According to this definition, 
the master’s degree and the doctorate degree meet the criteria for graduate education. 
Furthermore, since professional degree holders also have advanced education levels, 
usually beyond the baccalaureate degree, these officers’ promotion and retention patterns 
are also investigated. 
This chapter describes the relationship between graduate education and the 
promotion policy and service obligations related to graduate education of the United 
States Army. It first explains the graduate education policy, and then the service 
obligations related to graduate education. Finally, it discusses promotion policy and 
service obligations. 
A. GRADUATE EDUCATION POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 
It is Department of Defense (DoD) policy to fund graduate education fully and 
partially for Active Duty (AD) military officers when the education is required to fill 
Military Service requirements for validated positions.4 Thus, the priority in graduate 
education is the Army’s needs.  
There are four ways for United States Army officers to obtain a graduate degree. 
These include fully funded graduate education, partially funded graduate education, 
unfunded graduate education, and fellowships and scholarships. Eligibility requirements 
and service obligations differ for each of these graduate education options.   
1. Fully Funded Graduate Education 
Under the fully funded graduate education option the officer receives full pay and 
allowances while pursuing a graduate degree, with the majority of the tuition and other 
                                                 
4 Department of Defense Directive 1322.10, Policy on Graduate Education for Military Officers, 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters DoD, 26 August 2004), 2. 
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schooling costs assumed or paid by the U.S. Government or by another organization. The 
officer attends school instead of performing usual military duties. 5 
The length of schooling will vary with the curriculum, but will not normally 
exceed 18 months of continuous full-time study. (Graduate study to prepare for an 
assignment to the staff and faculty at United States Military Academy may require 18 to 
24 months.) To meet validated Army Educational Requirements System (AERS) 
requirements by specialty and grade, participants agree to study in an academic discipline 
consistent with the officer’s designated specialties. In cases where this does not occur, the 
officer will be awarded an appropriate supported specialty.6 
a.  Eligibility7 
• Status. Commissioned officers must be on active duty and serving 
in Regular Army or in Voluntary Indefinite status at the time of application and selection. 
Soldiers must agree in writing to fulfill any service obligation incurred by acceptance of 
training or schooling. 
• Potential. A review of the candidate’s career management 
individual file (CMIF) must reflect that the officer has potential for future, long term 
service, as determined by U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM). 
• Interest. Officers must express specific interest in training by 
signing and submitting a formal application. 
• Branch Qualification. Commissioned officers must have 
completed the Captain Professional Military Education (to include the perspective branch 
advanced course and Combined Arms and Service Staff School), and be branch qualified 
at company grade level prior to being selected for advanced civilian schooling. 
• Minimum academic requirements. Officers must have completed a 
baccalaureate degree with a minimum grade point average (GPA) of 2.5. If an officer 
                                                 
5 Department of Defense Directive 1322.10, Policy on Graduate Education for Military Officers, 6. 
6 Army Regulation 621-21, Training of Military Personnel at Civilian Institutions,(Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 20 August 1999), 16. 
7 Ibid., 16-17. 
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holds more than one completed baccalaureate degree, the highest GPA will be 
considered. Minimum scores for the Graduate Record Examination test (GRE) must be 
500 in each of the three academic areas (verbal, quantitative, and analytical), and for the 
Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT), minimum score must be 500.  
b.  Funding8 
• Tuition. PERSCOM pays all tuition and fees for students enrolled 
in the fully funded program. Certain fees will not be paid, such as health insurance, 
parking passes, student IDs, and transcript and graduation fees. 
• Book Allowance. Students will receive an initial payment of $600 
upon entry into schooling to support application fees, books, and start-up costs. Students 
will then receive an allowance to defray the cost of books in the amount of $200 upon the 
completion of each semester. In addition, students are reimbursed up to $200 for a 
master’s thesis or $500 for a Ph.D. dissertation. 
2. Partially Funded Graduate Education9 
While pursuing a graduate degree, the officer receives full pay and allowances 
with the majority of the tuition and other schooling paid by the officer from personal 
funds and/or benefits to which the officer is entitled. The officer attends school instead of 
performing usual military duties. 
3. Unfunded Graduate Education10 
While pursuing a graduate degree, the majority of tuition and other schooling 
costs are paid by the officer from personal funds and/or benefits to which the officer is 
entitled. The officer attends school during off-duty times. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Army Regulation 621-21, Training of Military Personnel at Civilian Institutions, 19. 
9 Department of Defense Directive 1322.10, Policy on Graduate Education for Military Officers, 6. 
10 Ibid. 
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4. Army Fellowships and Scholarships11  
Department of the Army personnel may compete for non-military Education 
Level (non-MEL) fellowships or scholarships with educational or training purposes. They 
may compete for and accept non-MEL fellowships or scholarships offered by eligible 
sponsors/donors for educational purposes or research in the United States or abroad. 
a.  Eligibility12  
Commissioned officers must be on active duty status in an active or 
reserve component of the Army in order to be eligible to compete for a non-MEL 
fellowship or scholarship. Officers may not compete for multiple non-MEL programs. An 
officer cannot have more than 19 years of Active Federal Commissioned Service. 
B.  SERVICE OBLIGATIONS RELATED TO GRADUATE EDUCATION 
1.   The DoD’s Policy on Service Obligation Related to Graduate 
Education13 
Officers who have received a fully funded or partially funded graduate education 
are required to serve on Active Duty (AD) for the time period specified. This service 
obligation varies with the civilian schooling opportunity and the length of the schooling.  
Officers who have received a fully funded or partially funded graduate education 
opportunity and who, voluntarily or because of misconduct, fail to complete the period of 
AD obligation specified in return for that educational opportunity, are required to 




                                                 
11 Army Regulation 621-7, Army Fellowships and Scholarships, (Department of the Army 
Headquarters, Washington, DC, 8 August 1997), 2. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Department of Defense Directive 1322.10, Policy on Graduate Education for Military Officers, 3. 
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2. The Army’s Policy on Service Obligation Related to Graduate 
Education 
Officers who attend fully funded courses at civilian institutions for more than 60 
days will incur an Active Duty Service Obligation (ADSO) upon completion or 
termination of the education. The ADSO will equal 3 times the length of the schooling.14 
Officers who accept statutory fellowships and scholarships incur an ADSO on 
completion or termination of the education. The ADSO will equal three times the length 
of schooling, computed in days, and may exceed 6 years.15 
Officers who participate in partially funded programs for more than 60 days incur 
an ADSO upon completion or termination of the education. The ADSO will equal three 
times the length of the schooling.16 
Officers participating in scholarship or grant programs incur an obligation and 
must agree, in writing, to remain on active duty upon completion or termination of 
training/education for a period of not less than three times the length of the training or 
education, computed in days.17 
Officers participating in non-MEL fellowships incur, and must agree in writing, to 
an active duty service obligation of two years.18 
C.  OFFICER PROMOTIONS 
1. DoD’s Policy on Officer Promotions 
While the process of promoting to fill requirements in the  grades O-4 through O-
6 by competitive category may result in different promotion timing and opportunity for 
certain competitive categories, promotion opportunity in a category is expected to be 
                                                 
14 Army Regulation 350-100, Officer Active Duty Service Obligations, (Washington, DC, 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 5 May 2006), 4. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Army Regulation 621-7, Army Fellowships and Scholarship, 3. 
18 Ibid. 
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relatively similar over a five-year period.19 Promotion of officers serving on the Active 
Duty List20 under promotion timing and minimum opportunity is provided in Table 1.21  
 
Table 1.   Desired Active Duty List Promotion Timing and Opportunity 
TO GRADE TIMING OPPORTUNITY 
O4 10 YEARS +/- 1 YEAR 80 percent 
O5 16 YEARS +/- 1 YEAR 70 percent 
O6 22 YEARS +/- 1 YEAR 50 percent 
 Source: From Department of Defense Instruction 1320.14, Commissioned Officer 
Promotion Program Procedures, (Washington DC, Headquarters, Department of 
Defense, 24 September 1996) 
 
It is recognized that promotion opportunity and timing, as determined by the 
Secretary of the Military Department, may vary from the targets in Table.1 based on 
needs.22 Thus, the important thing for promotion is the service’s needs. So, timing will be 
different according to each officer’s productivity. As a result, this study examines the 
relationship between education level and promotion. 
The number of officers on the Active Duty List or the Reserve Active Status list23 
may be recommended for promotion to the grades of colonel and below from among 
those being considered from below the promotion zone.24 In any competitive category 
                                                 
19 Department of Defense Instruction 1320.13, Commissioned Officer Promotion Reports (COPRs) 
and Procedures, (Department of Defense Headquarters, Washington DC, 21 June 1996), 4. 
20 Active Duty List is a single list for the Army that contains the names of all officers of that Military 
Service, other than warrant officers, who are serving on active duty. 
21 Department of Defense Instruction 1320.14, Commissioned Officer Promotion Program 
Procedures, (Washington DC, Headquarters, Department of Defense, 24 September 1996), 4. 
22 Ibid., 5. 
23 Reserve Active Status List is a single list for the Army which contains the names of all officers of 
that Armed Force, except warrant officers, who are in an active status in a reserve component of the Army 
and not on an Active Duty List. 
24 The below-the-zone promotion capability is the accelerated promotion of outstanding officers who 
have demonstrated performance and indicated potential clearly superior to those who otherwise would be 
promoted. Below-the-zone promotions apply only to promotion to the grades of major, lieutenant colonel 
and colonel. 
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the number may not exceed a number equal to 10 percent of the maximum number of 
officers to be recommended for promotion in such competitive category.25 The Secretary 
of Defense may authorize a greater number, not to exceed 15 percent of the total number 
of officers that the board is authorized to recommend for promotion, if he or she 
determines that the needs of the Service so require.26 
2. Army’s Policy on Officer Promotions  
The Army’s policy is contingent on the DoD’s policy. The timing and promotion 
opportunities are the same.  In the Army, approximately 80 percent of officers can make 
it to O-4 in ten years according to DoD’s policy, which is the main focus of this study.  
a. Promotion Eligibility27 
• To be considered for promotion by a selection board, an officer 
must be on the active duty list (ADL) on the day the board convenes.  
• Second Lieutenant (2LT) and First Lieutenant (1LT). The law 
establishes no minimum Time in Grade (TIG) requirements for consideration for 
promotion; however, an officer must have at least 18 months TIG to be promoted to 1LT 
and two years TIG to be promoted to Captain (CPT). The TIG requirement for promotion 
to 1LT has been extended to two years by the authority of the Secretary of the Army 
(SA).  
• CPT, Major (MAJ), and Lieutenant Colonel (LTC). These officers 
must serve at least three years TIG to be considered for promotion. This requirement may 
be waived by the SA, for consideration from below the zone. 
• Colonel (COL). Officers must serve one year TIG to be considered 
for promotion. If selected, they may be promoted without regard to any additional TIG 
requirements. 
                                                 
25 Department of Defense Instruction 1320.1, Commissioned Officer Promotion Reports (COPRs) and 
Procedures, 5. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Army Regulation 600-8-29, Officer Promotions (Department of the Army Headquarters, 
Washington DC, 25 February 2005), 2-3. 
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• TIG requirements for the Army commissioned officers are 
presented in Table.2. 
 
Table 2.   Time in Grade Requirements for Commissioned Officers 
From To Minimum Years in Lower Maximum Years in Lower 
O1(2LT) O2(1LT) 2 42 months 
O2(1LT) O3(CPT) 2 5 
O3(CPT) O4(MAJ) 3 7 







Announced annually. Normal 
TIG is five years, subject to the 
needs of the Army. 
 Source: After Army Regulation 600-8-29, Officer Promotions (Department of the 
Army Headquarters, Washington DC, 25 February 2005), and Army Regulation 135-155, 
Promotion of Commissioned Officers and Warrant Officers Other Than General Officers 
(Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, DC, 13 July 2004). 
 
b.  Selective Continuation28 
• Subject to the needs of the Army, officers pending separation 
because of having twice failed to be selected for promotion to MAJ or LTC may be 
selectively continued on active duty in their present grade. 
• Selectively continued officers, if otherwise eligible, will continue 
to be considered for promotion until separation. 
• Continuation for captains and majors who are more than six years 
from qualifying for retirement will normally be from the date the officer would otherwise 
have been separated for having twice failed to be selected for promotion, or until the last 
day of the month in which the officer first becomes eligible for retirement under any 
provision of law - whichever is earlier. The SA may adjust the period of selective 
continuation.  
                                                 
28 Army Regulation 600-8-29, Officer Promotions, 5. 
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• Selectively continued majors within six years of qualifying for 
retirement will be continued on active duty until eligible for retirement under the 
provisions of USC Title 10, section 3911 (unless sooner discharged under other 
provisions of law or regulation). They will be retired (if they apply) or discharged. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter first establishes a definition of graduate education for the study.  It 
then explains the various modes of acquiring graduate education, as well as their 
respective eligibility requirements. These methods include fully funded, partially-funded, 
unfunded graduate education and Army fellowships and scholarships. The chapter further 
defines the Army’s promotion policy, as well as timing and eligibility. To be considered 
for promotion by a selection board, an officer must be on the active duty list on the day 
the board convenes. Officers should serve at least nine years after commissioning and 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The returns of education are generally measured in terms of increased earnings 
and more frequent promotions for individuals with a higher level of education. For firms 
or organizations, returns are measured in terms of increased productivity and retention. 
This chapter explains human capital theory and its application in the Army. It then 
summarizes and discusses studies related to retention and promotion. This chapter also 
provides a close examination of studies explaining the effect of graduate education on 
retention or promotion, or both. 
A.  HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY 
That education is an investment is one of the main concepts of human capital 
theory. People invest in additional education if the present value29 of additional future 
earnings exceeds the present value of costs, or they invest if the return on investment is 
greater than their discount rates. 
Human capital theory claims that expenditure on training and education should 
be considered an investment since it is assumed that personal income is later increased 
as the result of current expenditures on training and education.30 The human capital 
approach is often used to explain occupational wage differentials.31 In the Army, 
compensation differs according to the ranks. So, if an officer is promoted more rapidly, 
then he or she increases his or her earnings.  
People who learn easily and rapidly are more likely to acquire advanced 
education. Furthermore, their decisions about advanced education are also affected by 
                                                 
29 Present value is discounted value of future earnings or investments. For more information, see 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Robert S. Smith, Modern Labor Economics, 9th ed. (New York: Pearson 
Education, Inc, 2006). 
30 G S Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to 
Education (New York, 1964), <http://www.economyprofessor.com/economictheories/human-capital-
theory.php> (accessed October 9, 2006).     
31 Ibid. 
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their expectations about their future earnings.32 When workers make investments in 
education and training, the expected returns are higher future earnings, increased job 
satisfaction over their lifetimes, and other quality of life improvements.33 
Education level is used as a screening device by most employers. Acquiring a 
higher level of education requires hard work and study, which may correlate with 
capability. People who find learning to be especially difficult will think that acquiring 
education requires a higher marginal cost.34  Individuals with higher marginal costs will 
acquire lower levels of human capital.35 If those who have lower costs of acquiring 
education are also of higher ability and are more productive on the job, then educational 
level can serve as a useful criterion for employers in screening for employment and 
promotion.36 
Based on this idea of education level as a screening device, one may consider 
officers who invest in education to be those who learn easily and quickly. In addition, one 
might consider officers who learn easily to be of higher ability and more productive on 
the job. In this study, the proof of productivity is promotion. If officers with graduate 
degrees are promoted at a greater rate than those without graduate degrees, then they are 
considered more productive. Moreover, officers in the same rank who serve in the same 
geographic area and perform the same job, receive the same pay. In order for the officer 
to obtain returns on education, he or she must be promoted to a higher rank in a shorter 
period of time. Only if an officer is promoted do his or her earnings increase. 
Another concept related to investment in education and training is that increased 
education results in increased job satisfaction in the future. According to this idea, 
officers who have graduate degrees will have increased satisfaction in their jobs. As a 
                                                 
32 Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Robert S. Smith, Modern Labor Economics, 9th ed. (New York: Pearson 
Education, Inc, 2006), 277. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 280. 
35 Ibid., 281. 
36 Ibid., 303. 
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result of their increased job satisfaction, officers with graduate degrees can be expected to 
stay in the Army longer than officers without those degrees.   
Most of the training and education costs for officers are borne by the Army. In 
this case, we can also apply human capital theory to the Army. The Army expects 
increased retention and higher productivity as a result of its educational investments. In 
fact, retention is directly impacted by the service obligations owed by the officers whose 
education costs are paid by the Army. In short, benefits of higher education for the Army 
are increased retention, manning readiness, and increased productivity, measured by 
promotion. 
Finally, the Armed Forces provide a good example of promotion tournaments. A 
promotion tournament is a kind of employee motivation method that is common in the 
environment of an internal labor market.37 Tournaments have three important features. 
First, the winner is not known at the beginning, so everybody has a chance to win. 
Second, the winner is selected based on performance, which is compared with other 
contestants’ performances. Third, the rewards should be large enough that there would be 
substantial differences between losers and winners. Thus, tournaments have two 
purposes: to motivate all employees and reward hard-working employees. Tournaments 
work in the military by promoting successful officers to a higher rank, and providing 
increased earnings and higher management level jobs.  
There is no commander who has been assigned directly to any level of command 
duty who has not served at the previous level. For example, in order to be a battalion 
commander, an officer must first serve as a company commander, and then he or she can 
be promoted to the next rank. Each officer begins at a very low level (usually O-1) and 
makes his or her way up to higher levels. Thus, this study examines how graduate 
education affects the promotion tournament.  
 
 
                                                 
37 Ehrenberg and Smith, 376, 377. 
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B. LITERATURE DISCUSSION 
Although there are many studies related to the effect of education on Navy and 
Marine Corps officers, studies dealing with the effects of education for Army officers are 
not as common. For this reason, some of the studies discussed in this chapter are related 
to services other than the Army. 
1. Study by Buterbaugh (1995) 
In his master's thesis, "A Multivariate Analysis of the Effects of Academic 
Performance and Graduate Education on the Promotion of Senior U.S. Navy Officers," 
Thomas A Buterbaugh examined the effects of undergraduate background and fully-
funded graduate education on promotion to the ranks of Commander (O-5) and Captain 
(O-6) in the Navy. For the purpose of this thesis, only the section of Buterbaugh’s study 
pertaining to graduate education is discussed. 
Buterbaugh used the officer promotion history files from 1981 to 1994 to obtain 
data for his analysis. The data set included all Navy officers who appeared before 
Commander and Captain promotion boards during those years. He analyzed five warfare 
communities in his study: Surface Warfare Officers (SWO), Submarine Warfare Officers, 
Pilots, Naval Flight Officers (NFOs), and combined Fleet Support and Supply officers. 
Furthermore, he obtained results for the aggregation of these five communities. 
Buterbaugh's dependent variable in the study was PROMOTED, which was equal 
to one if an officer was promoted to O-5 or O-6, and zero if an officer was not promoted 
to O-5 or O-6. His first explanatory variable was Fully-Funded Graduate Education 
(FFGE), which had values of zero or one (one, if an officer had a graduate degree). The 
other explanatory variables were gender, race, officer’s undergraduate performance, the 
“quality” of undergraduate education institute attended, whether or not the undergraduate 
degree was in a technical field of study, marital status, kids (=1 if married with dependent 
children), and prior enlisted background. For the aggregate model, he also used career 
paths as an explanatory variable. He did not use gender as a variable in the Submarine 
model, since there are no female officers in this community.  
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Buterbaugh used linear regression and Probit models in his study. His reason for 
using these models was that the binary nature of the dependent variable PROMOTED 
allowed for estimation of multivariate models using both ordinary least squares (OLS) for 
Linear Probability Models, and maximum likelihood procedures for Probit models.38  
Results of OLS aggregate model showed that officers with a fully-funded 
graduate degree had higher probabilities of being promoted to the rank of Commander by 
8.7 percent. Logit model results were approximately the same as OLS results. His other 
findings as a result of OLS model were as follows: 
• Officers who had superior undergraduate academic performance had 
higher probabilities of being promoted to the rank of Commander by 6.6 percent. 
• Officers who were male, white, United States Naval Academy (USNA) 
graduates and with at least one child had higher promotion probabilities. 
• Officers who were enlisted before being commissioned as officers, and 
whose undergraduate degrees were in math-intensive or engineering fields were less 
likely to be promoted to O-5. 
The results for the promotion to Captain (O-6) model were a little bit different. 
According to this model, graduate education had no significant effect on promotion to O-
6. Other findings for this model were as follows: 
• Higher undergraduate academic performance, being a USNA graduate and 
having dependent children had positive effects on promotion to Captain. 
• Prior enlisted officers had a lower probability of being promoted to 
Captain. 
• Gender, race, marital status, and dependent children had no significant 
effect on promotion to Captain. 
Buterbaugh also conducted analyses for separate officer communities. In the 
promotion to O-5 model, only Surface Warfare, Fleet Support and Supply officers  
 
                                                 
38 Thomas A.Buterbaugh, “A Multivariate Analysis of the Effects of Academic Performance and 
Graduate Education on the Promotion of Senior U.S. Navy Officers,” (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, 1995), 22. 
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revealed significant positive effects of graduate education. On the other hand, in the 
promotion to O-6 model, graduate education had a positive significant effect only for the 
Fleet Support and Supply officers. 
One weakness of his study is that selection bias is not mentioned. It is likely that 
the officers who were selected for graduate education, and thus obtained graduate 
degrees, were the officers who would be promoted anyway. 39 In addition, they might 
have been selected for graduate education because of their past achievements in their 
jobs. On the other hand, the limitations of the data set affected the scope of the study. For 
example, adding the performance report of an officer during the command tour might 
reveal better results.40 However, because of the lack of the variable in the data set, he 
was not able to use this variable in the analysis. 
2. Study by Wielsma (1996) 
In his master’s thesis, “An Analysis of Factors Affecting Promotion, Retention 
and Performance for USMC Officers: A Graduate Education perspective,” Ronald 
J.Wielsma analyzed the factors associated with promotion to O-4, retention to the O-4 
point, and actual performance ratings for Marine Corps officers.41 He focused especially 
on the effect of graduate education on measures of on-the-job performance. 
Wielsma collected data from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), the 
Marine Corps Automated Fitness Report System (AFRS), the Headquarters Master File 
(HMF), the Official Military Personnel File, and specific data from Marine Corps 
Headquarters. He combined all data from different sources into one file to use for 
analysis. He used officers who were commissioned in 1980 for his analysis. 
For the retention model, the dependent variable Wielsma used was STAYPROM, 
which was equal to one if the officer stayed to the O-4 promotion point and zero if he or 
                                                 
39 Buterbaugh, 46 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ronald J.Wielsma, “An Analysis of Factors Affecting Promotion, Retention and Performance for 
USMC Officers: A Graduate Education perspective”, (Masters’ thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, 1996) 
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she did not stay to the O-4 promotion point. For the promotion model, the dependent 
variable was PROMOTE, which was equal to one if the officer was promoted to O-4, and 
zero if he or she was not promoted to grade 4 level.  
He defined explanatory variables in three different groups as follows: 
• Cognitive Skills (General Classification Test Score taken upon entry, 
composite ranking at the basic school and graduate degree); 
• Affective Traits (Commissioning sources, prior enlisted situation, and 
MOS’s); and 
• Demographic Traits (Age at entry, race, gender, marital status and 
unemployment rate). 
Wielsma used Probit models for his analysis.  In one model, he analyzed the 
effect of graduate education on retention, and in a second model he analyzed the effect of 
graduate education on promotion to O-4.  He found that actual on-the-job performance is 
an important factor in determining retention and promotion.42 
For the analysis of promotion, he ran several different models, each time adding 
different additional explanatory variables to the model in order to get rid of potential 
omitted variable bias. First he ran the simple model, in which the dependent variable was 
PROMOTE (promotion to O-4), and explanatory variables were composite ranking at the 
basic school (COMPRK), graduate education background, level of education 
(OBPGRAD, which is equal to one if an officer obtained a postgraduate degree since 
entering the Marine Corps), the officers' MOS, the officers’ commissioning source, 
minority, marital status and gender. Second, he ran the same model but added the score 
for the General Classification Test (GCT), which is taken upon entry, to the model as an 
explanatory variable. Third, he ran the model again, removing GCT and adding Average 
Performance Index to the previous model. The marine corps officers are evaluated 
according to their characteristics and on-the-job achievements. Those scores are summed 
and then divided by the number of observed marks to find an average index for each 
officer. This average index shows the officers' evaluated performance. Finally, he ran  
                                                 
42 Wielsma, 39-56. 
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another model, adding both these two independent variables. He concluded that, of those 
four models, the third one, which added only Average Performance Index, was the best of 
the promotion models. 
Wielsma pointed out that there might also be sample selection bias in his models 
due to the fact that officers selected for graduate education are more likely to be 
promoted because of the selection process, even without graduate education. Selection 
bias might be caused by differences in characteristics between those who stay long 
enough for promotion to O-4 and those who do not stay (unobserved). In order to correct 
for sample selection bias he used the Heckman model.  
In the retention model, again, to get rid of omitted variable bias, he used two 
models: the first one was the simple model, and second one was obtained by adding 
Average Performance Index of officers to the first model. In the simple model the 
dependent variable was staying until O-4 point (STAYPROM) and the independent 
variables were cognitive skills, affective traits, and demographic treats. In the first model 
he excluded the average performance index (AVGPI) from the model, and in the second 
one, he added this variable to the model. He found that the second model was superior.  
Wielsma's aim was to find the direction of the relationship between graduate 
education and retention and promotion. Thus, he concluded that graduate education and 
retention and promotion were positively correlated. His other findings are as follows: 
• An officer’s General Classification Test Score and occupational 
community have no significant effect on both retention and promotion. 
• Individual demographic characteristics are not significant in the promotion 
model. 
According to Wielsma, the size of the data sample and the contents severely 
limited the full analysis of explanatory variables. The variables were not recorded well 
before 1986. For this reason, some of the independent variables which were used in 
previous studies were not available in his study, such as fitness reports and college grade 
point average.  For example, he wanted to compare the fitness reports before and after 
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obtaining graduate degrees, but it was not possible to create a performance variable to 
document the before and after treatment effects, due to a lack of necessary information.43  
3.  Study by Mehay and Bowman (1998) 
In their study “Graduate Education and Employee Performance: Evidence from 
Military Personnel,” William R. Bowman and Stephen L.Mehay examined the specific 
relationship between graduate education and on-the-job performance for officers in the 
United States Navy.44 In their study, the main question was whether the relationship 
between education level and earnings is due to learning or sorting by employers; that is, 
they wanted to find out if an increase in education level also increased earnings. Thus, if 
rank of an officer with a graduate degree increased faster than for an officer without a 
graduate degree, then this result would confirm a positive relationship. The objective of 
the study was to examine job success for Navy officers. 
Mehay and Bowman mainly used the Navy’s Promotion History File in order to 
obtain data to use in their analysis. These data provided background information about all 
Navy officers who were reviewed for promotion between 1985 and 1990. They 
augmented this file with supervisor evaluations (fitness reports) before the O-4 promotion 
review. Officers are classified into two occupational categories in the Navy – line and 
staff.45 Line specialists work in the primary operational areas of the Navy, such as 
aviation, ship operations and submarine operations. Staff officers primarily perform 
administrative functions, and provide specialized support to line officers. Staff functions 
in the Navy include medical, dental, personnel, legal, supply and religious occupations. 
After deleting observations with missing data, the data file used for the analysis contained 
4,230 line officers and 2,353 staff officers. 
According to the authors, using data from a military organization would provide 
perfect information for this kind of analysis, since military organizations do not usually 
                                                 
43 Wielsma, 61. 
44 William R. Bowman and Stephen L. Mehay, “Graduate Education and Employee Performance: 
Evidence from Military Personnel,” Economics of Education Review (1998) 
45 Ibid., 455. 
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allow lateral transfers from any other organization. All officers must begin their careers 
in entry-level positions. Most advanced education is obtained after participating in the 
organization and it is mostly funded by the military. According to Mehay and Bowman, 
the important implication of hierarchical organizational forms such as the military, is that 
the direct and indirect span of control increases with rank.46 
Mehay and Bowman used several different models to find the effect of graduate 
education on promotion to O-4, adding explanatory variables each time to the model. In 
general, they found that graduate education has a positive effect on promotion to grade 4; 
however, these effects are significantly reduced in instrumental variable estimates that 
adjust for selection bias.47 According to their findings, the marginal effect of graduate 
education is 0.098 and 0.145 for line and staff officers respectively. However, when they 
include additional variables, the marginal effect decreases to 0.065 for line officers and to 
0.089 for staff officers. 
They first estimated a Probit promotion model to test whether graduate education 
has a measurable effect on the performance of an officer, which was measured by 
promotion probability. In this model, they found that any graduate education degree had a 
significantly positive effect on promotion to grade 4. Officers with graduate degrees had 
10-15 percentage points higher promotion probabilities than those without graduate 
degrees. Female, younger, and married officers were also more likely to be promoted. 
The promotion probability for minorities was lower than for other officers. The 
promotion probability of Naval Academy graduates was significantly higher than that of 
the other accession sources.48    
However, when instruments that are uncorrelated with promotion are used to 
predict graduate degree status, the results suggest that a sizeable portion of the 
relationship between graduate education and promotion is due to unobserved attributes 
that lead some people to attend (or be selected for) graduate school, especially for the 
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47 Ibid., 454. 
48 Ibid., 456 
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Navy’s program, and to become more promotable.49 The selection-corrected estimates of 
the promotion effect of graduate education are reduced by between 40 and 50 percent.50 
Mehay and Bowman concluded that graduate education increased skills and 
provided a mechanism to sort individuals who had the greatest value to the Navy. 
Individuals who are more career-oriented signal these attributes by means of their 
willingness to attend graduate school. Among career-oriented officers, the Navy selects 
those whose early performance indicates greater potential for jobs at the upper levels of 
the organization.51 
4. Study by Branigan (2001) 
In his thesis, “The Effect of Graduate Education on the Retention and Promotion 
of Marine Corps Officers,” Gregory A.Branigan examined the relationship between 
graduate education and retention and promotion in the Marine Corps. He estimated the 
effect of graduate degrees either from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) or from 
sources other than NPS on the promotion and retention of Marine Corps officers. 
Branigan collected data for his study from different sources. He obtained 
Promotion Board Data for majors who had been considered for promotion to lieutenant 
colonel from FY 1998 to FY 2001. He also obtained Cohort Data from the Center for 
Naval Analysis for officers who had been commissioned between 1974 and 1984, who 
remained on active duty after November 1984. He collected additional cohort data from 
the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) West, and the Manpower Information 
(MI), and Performance Evaluation divisions at Headquarters Marine Corps. He also 
obtained data regarding graduate education from the Naval Postgraduate School for those 
officers who graduated from NPS between 1983 and 2000. Finally, he merged all these 
data files to construct a single file for analysis. There were 6,507 officers commissioned 
as O-1’s in this file, which he called the Accession Cohort Sample. 
                                                 




For analysis of promotions, Branigan created a second data file from the first file 
by selecting officers who served on active duty long enough to be considered for 
promotion to O-5. He called this file the “Promotion Sample”. This file was drawn as a 
subset of the Accession Cohort Sample.  
Branigan used Probit Models for both retention and promotion outcomes.  He 
chose the Probit Model because the outcomes of the research were binary. He used two 
different models for each analysis. One included a variable for all officers who had 
master's degrees and another one divided officers in two groups, those who obtained 
degrees from NPS and those who obtained degrees from any other source. He used the 
Heckman sample selection correction method to adjust for sample selection bias.  
His model specification was based on Wise (1975), Wielsma (1996) and Bowman 
and Mehay (1999). His dependent variable for the retention model was SURVIVE, which 
was equal to one if the officer survived to the O-5 board, and zero if not. For the 
promotion model, the dependent variable was SELECT, which was equal to one if the 
officer was selected for O-5, and zero if he or she was not selected. 
 He classified explanatory variables in five groups as follows: 
• Performance Traits (Performance Evaluation Index, College Grade 
Point Average, personal awards, intermediate school completion); 
• Cognitive Traits (Education level, degree from NPS or other 
school and General Classification Test Score); 
• Affective Traits (commissioning sources, Military Occupational 
Specialties (MOS) and Combat Fitness Report results); 
• Demographic Traits (age at commissioning, Marital status, number 
of dependents, gender and race); and 
• Career Traits (national unemployment rate and whether an officer 
was in-zone in O-5 Board in 1988, 1999, 2000, or 2001). 
 Branigan found that an officer with a master's degree is 12 percent more likely to 
survive and 15 percent more likely to be promoted than an officer who does not have an 
advanced degree. An officer who obtained a degree from NPS is 10.6 percent more likely 
to survive and 10.7 percent more likely to be promoted than an officer who does not have 
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a master's degree. An officer who obtained a graduate degree from any source other than 
NPS is 12.5 percent more likely to survive and 16.7 percent more likely to be promoted 
than an officer who does not have a graduate degree.  For both promotion and retention, 
the effect of having a graduate degree from any source other than NPS was greater than 
the effect of having a degree from NPS. His other findings were as follows: 
• Officers with a higher performance index, with more dependents, with 
combat experience, aviators and officers who had been married were more likely to 
survive until the O-5 promotion point. 
• Officers with active duty enlisted experience and males were less likely to 
survive to the O-5 promotion point. 
• Officers who had higher performance index, a greater number of rewards, 
completed their intermediate-level Professional Military Education, were younger at the 
time of commissioning and who were female were more likely to be selected for 
promotion to O-5. 
• Aviators and those from aviation support MOS’s were more likely to be 
promoted than those in combat arms MOS's. 
Branigan thought that the limitations for the study were due to insufficient data. 
The inclusion of graduate education from MPE institutions in the NON_NPS variable 
could be the dominant factor in the findings of the study. For this reason, he pointed out 
that his findings should not be used for policy decisions. 
5.  Study by Fagan (2002) 
In his master's thesis, “Analysis of Determinants of Training Performance, 
Retention, And Promotion to Lieutenant Commander of Naval Flight Officers,” Billy 
K.Fagan analyzed the effect of different characteristics on training performance, 
retention, and promotion of Naval Flight Officers (NFOs). One of these characteristics 
was graduate education. For the purpose of this study, only the parts of this study 
pertaining to retention and promotion are summarized. 
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Fagan used the “All Officers” data set in his analysis. The data set included 
34,724 naval officers who were commissioned from 1983 to 1990. He created an “NFO 
data set” from this main data set. There were 4,490 observations in this data set. 
For his retention model the dependent variable was LCDRSTAY, which was 
equal to one if an officer retained until the LCDR promotion board, and zero if an officer 
did not stay to that point. The dependent variable for his promotion model was also 
binary and called LCDRPROM, which was equal to one if an officer was selected for 
LCDR promotion, and zero if an officer was not selected for promotion. 
Fagan defined his independent variables in two major groups. The first group was 
personal characteristics, which consisted of gender, race/ethnicity, age at commissioning, 
undergraduate major, Barron’s code (BC), and dependent status. The second group was 
called professional characteristics and included prior enlisted situation, carrier, graduate 
education status, lateral transfers, months to wing, and quality of NFO. 
Fagan used a Probit model specification in the analysis. He ran two different 
models, one for retention and one for promotion. (A third model was estimated for 
training, which is not discussed in this study.)  
In his retention model, Fagan found that married officers with children, older 
NFOs, USNA and NROTC graduates, and prior enlisted officers are more likely to be 
retained.52 Furthermore, he found that female officers, single officers with no 
dependents, SNFOs who attrite from training, OCS graduates, and Maritime NFOs are 
less likely to stay until the LCDR (O-4) promotion point. Unfortunately, he did not use 
graduate education as a variable in the retention model. 
In his promotion model, Fagan found that graduate education has no significant 
effect on promotion to LCDR. He explained this result by suggesting that the primary 
determining factor in promotion to LCDR is not a graduate education, but rather, the 
officer’s performance during the first sea tour. Moreover, he found that younger (less 
                                                 
52 Billy K.Fagan, “Analysis Of Determinants Of Training Performance, Retention, And Promotion To 
Lieutenant Commander Of Naval Flight Officers,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, 2002) 
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than 23 years old at the time of commissioning) married officers with or without children, 
USNA and OCS graduates, NROTC graduates from less selective schools, and those who 
complete NFO training the fastest are more likely to be promoted.53 
6. Study by Kabalar (2003) 
In his thesis, “Multivariate Analysis of the Effect of Graduate Education on 
Promotion to Army Lieutenant Colonel,” Hakan Kabalar estimated the effect of graduate 
education and other factors on promotion to lieutenant colonel (O-5) in the Army. His 
focus was primarily on determining whether graduate education provided officers with 
higher promotion probabilities.54  
Kabalar used the Active Duty Military Master File Data, provided by Defense 
Manpower Data Center, for fiscal years 1981 to 2001 in his analysis. He used only the 
first three cohort data sets (1981, 1982, and 1983) for the study. The 1981 cohort had 
2,653 observations, the 1982 cohort had 2,274 observations, and the 1983 cohort had 
1,907 observations.55 To prevent any bias from early resignations, only officers who 
reached the rank of O-3 were selected for the analysis.56  
The dependent variable in Kabalar’s study was PROMOTED, which was equal to 
one if an officer was promoted to O-5, and equal to zero if an officer was not promoted to 
O-5. The explanatory variables were gender, race, marital status, number of dependents, 
education, commissioning source, career path, prior enlisted situation and age. He 
defined his education variable using two groups. The first group consisted of those with a 
baccalaureate degree or lower level. The second group held a master’s or a first 
professional degree, which he identified as graduate degrees. Kabalar used logistic 
regression and classification tree models in his study. He used a logistic regression model 
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because the outcome variable in logistic regression is binary or dichotomous.57  The 
reason for using a classification tree model was that tree-based modeling is an 
exploratory technique for uncovering structure in data. 
Kabalar found that graduate education is associated with a higher probability of 
promotion to the rank of Army O-5.58 The promotion ratio among officers with graduate 
degrees was 1.79-2.25 times the same ratio for officers without a graduate degree. His 
other findings were as follows: 
• Academy or ROTC/NROTC SCHOLARSHIP graduates and married 
officers had greater odds ratios for officer promotion compared to direct appointment 
commissioned officers and single officers. 
• Age had a negative effect on promotion. 
• Number of dependents, DOD primary occupation code, gender, and prior 
enlisted situation had no significant effect on promotion.  
7. Study by Kizilkaya (2004) 
In his master's thesis, “An Analysis of the Effect of Commissioning Sources on 
Retention and Promotion of U.S. Army Officers,” Zafer Kizilkaya used education level 
as an explanatory variable in a promotion to O-5 model. The main purpose of this thesis 
was to analyze the effect of commissioning sources on the retention and promotion of 
Army officers. 
Kizilkaya used a data set obtained from the Active Duty Military Master File, 
provided by Defense Manpower Data Center. This data set included officers who were 
commissioned between 1981 and 2001. In his retention model, there were 32,054 
observations; in his Promotion to O-4 model there were 25,740 observations; and in his 
promotion to O-5 model, there were 4,211 observations used for analysis. When selecting 
the variables for his analysis, he chose the variables used by Kabalar (2001). Those 
dependent and independent variables are shown in tables 3 and 4.  
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Table 3.   Dependent variables in Kizilkaya’s Study 
Source: From Zafer Kizilkaya, “An Analysis of the Effect of Commissioning 
Sources on Retention and Promotion of U.S. Army Officers,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2004) 
 
Kizilkaya did not use education as an explanatory variable in the promotion and 
retention to the rank of Major models. He explained that the reason for not including an 
education variable in those models was that most Army officers are selected for graduate 
schools only after finishing the Captains’ Career Course and serving as company 
commanders, so most would not have completed graduate education by the time they 
reached the rank of O-4. In Kizilkaya’s study, only models for promotion to O-5 included 
education as an explanatory variable. 
In his promotion to O-5 models, Kizilkaya used PROMOTED as a dependent 
variable, which was equal to one if an officer was promoted to O-5, and zero if an officer 
was not promoted to O-5. His explanatory variables were education level, marital status 
interacted with number of dependents, age at commissioning, race, prior enlisted situation 






RETAINED  0 IF THE OFFICER HAS A BLANK PAY GRADE AT 10 YEAR 
MARK 
 0 IF THE OFFICER A PAY GRADE AT 10 YEAR MARK 
PROMOTED.O4 0 IF THE OFFICER IS NOT PROMOTED TO O-4 
 1 IF THE OFFICER IS PROMOTED TO O-4 
PROMOTED.05 0 IF THE OFFICER IS NOT PROMOTED TO O-5 
 1 IF THE OFFICER IS PROMOTED TO O-5 
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Table 4.   The Independent Variables in Kizilkaya’s Study 
 
Source:  From Zafer Kizilkaya, “An Analysis of the Effect of Commissioning 
Sources on Retention and Promotion of U.S. Army Officers,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval 




Kizilkaya found that officers with graduate education were between 1.65 and 2.17 
times more likely to be promoted to O-5 (Lieutenant Colonel) than officers who did not 
have graduate degree. His other findings included the following: 
• Academy graduates were more likely to be promoted to Lieutenant 
Colonel than ROTC graduates and Direct Appointments. Direct Appointments had the 
lowest predicted promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. 
• Being married and not being prior enlisted positively affected promotion to 
Lieutenant Colonel. 
• Gender had no effect on promotion to Army Lieutenant Colonel. 
8. Study by Korkmaz (2005) 
In his Masters’ thesis, “Analysis of the Survival Patterns of United States Naval 
Officers,” Ibrahim Korkmaz evaluated the factors that affect the longevity of officers in 
the U.S. Navy. Although his focus in the study was commissioning source of officers, 
one of the variables in his survival model was the graduate education situation of an 
officer. Thus, in his study, he mentioned the effect of graduate education on the survival 
of United States naval officers. 
For his survival analysis, Korkmaz obtained data from Prof. William R. Bowman, 
Economics Department, U.S. Naval Academy. The data contained Navy Officer Data 
Card Information for 34,991 officers commissioned from 1983 to 1990. Prof. Bowman 
merged the Data Card files with O-3 (LT) and O-4 (LCDR) promotion board results for 
fiscal years 1986 through 2001. The data set was checked to determine whether officers 
left the service before the LT and LCDR points.59 
Korkmaz used Survival Analysis techniques in his analysis. He used the 
LIFETEST, LIFEREG, and PHREG procedures in the SAS software system as survival 
techniques.  
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His dependent variable in the analysis was SERVTIME (months served before 
leaving the service). He classified explanatory variables into five categories as follows: 
• Demographics (age at commissioning, race, gender, marital status with or 
without children); 
• Commissioning sources; 
• Community designators (Military Occupational Specialty);   
• Career characteristics (prior enlisted situation of an officer); and 
• Human capital variables (such as education level, college GPA, technical 
major in college and graduate education). 
Furthermore, he used fiscal year as a control variable. This set of variables showed the 
year in which an officer was commissioned as an O-1. 
According to his Duration Analysis (LIFEREG) procedure results, graduate 
education had no significant effect on the survival of officers. Korkmaz used Cox 
Proportional Hazards regression (PHREG) to analyze three different models - all 
separations, involuntary separations and voluntary separations.  In his Cox Proportional 
Hazards regression (PHREG) analysis results, graduate education had a significant effect 
on the separation behavior of officers only in the involuntary separations model. 
9. Study by Doganca (2006) 
In his master's thesis, “Officer Career Paths and the Effects of Commissioning 
Sources on the Survival Patterns of Army Officers”, Erkan Doganca analyzed the career 
paths of U.S. Army officers and evaluated the effect of commissioning source on their 
survival patterns.60 He also analyzed the effect of graduate education on the survival of 
U.S. Army officers. 
Doganca obtained the data for his analysis from the Active Duty Military Master 
File provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). The data set contained 
information about 103,501 Army officers who were commissioned between 1981 and 
2001. 
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He used N_ARMY (number of years a valid paygrade appears) as the dependent 
variable in his analysis. SEPARATE was his censoring variable which was equal to one 
if an officer separated from the service, and equal to zero if an officer did not separate. 
He defined independent variables in six different groups as follows: 
• Demographic Characteristics (age, race, gender, family status) 
• Commissioning Source 
• Occupation Codes (Occupation Categories) 
• Career Characteristics (prior enlisted situation) 
• Education (whether or not an officer graduated from any graduate 
education program) 
• Cohort Year (from 1981 to 2001)  
Like Korkmaz, Doganca used survival analysis for his study. He used the 
LIFETEST, LIFEREG and PHREG SAS software procedures. He found that graduate 
education had a significant positive effect on survival of Army officers; that is, officers 
with graduate degrees served longer than those without graduate degrees in the results of 
both LIFEREG and PHREG procedures. Other important findings in the study are as 
follows: 
• Although entry age and prior enlisted situation had no significant effect on 
the survival of Army officers in the LIFEREG procedure, they had positive effects in the 
PHREG model. 
• Being Hispanic had no effect on the survival in the results for both 
methods (LIFEREG and PHREG). 
• Being black, married and having more dependents had positive effects on 
the retention of Army officers. 
• Being female had a negative impact on the survival behavior of Army 
officers. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Although Fagan found that graduate education had no significant effect on 
promotion of Naval Flight Officers, Buterbaugh found different results (positive or 
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negative effects for different Navy communities) and Korkmaz found that graduate 
education had no significant effect on retention of Army officers, all other studies 
summarized in this chapter concluded that advanced education had a positive effect on 
retention and promotion; that is, it increases the  probability of staying in the Army 
longer, and it increases the probability of being promoted to the O-4, O-5 or O-6 grades. 
The independent variables other than graduate education varied among the studies. For 
example, some studies included performance measures such as fitness reports as an 
independent variable, while others did not. The next chapter explains variable selection 
and description for this study. 
None of the previous studies classified graduate education or advanced education 
as master's, doctorate and professional degrees, which is unique to this study. Classifying 
advanced education into those categories provides an opportunity to compare the effects 
of different graduate education levels on retention and promotion.  
 39
IV.  METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses survival analysis as an empirical method for estimating both 
promotion probabilities and retention behavior of U.S. Army officers. Although many 
studies have used survival analysis to analyze retention behavior, using survival analysis 
for promotion models is not so pervasive.  
This chapter explains the methodology used for this study and specifies 
hypothesized effects of selected explanatory variables on the retention and promotion of 
U.S. Army officers. It first briefly describes survival analysis. This is followed by an 
explanation of the variables used for the study and a discussion of the hypothesized 
effects of explanatory variables. 
A. SURVIVAL ANALYSIS 
Although survival analysis was first used to study the occurrence of deaths, today 
it is used in many fields of science, economics, and social sciences. Some examples of 
events that are studied using survival analysis include machine failures, promotion, 
retention and survival in any organization. The interpretation of coefficients of covariates 
in survival analysis, especially for promotion models, can be somewhat arduous. 
Explaining promotion of a group of people is difficult, since survival analysis is usually 
based on death, which is the opposite type of event from promotion. Nevertheless, if the 
main idea is captured, it is possible to interpret the effect of covariates on promotion 
probabilities. 
Survival analysis is a class of statistical methods for studying the occurrence and 
timing of events.61 Event is defined as a change in the general situation or transition from 
one situation to another, such as promotion and separation, as they are used in this study. 
This thesis examines the following events:  occurrence of promotion of U.S. Army 
officers to MAJOR rank (O-4 grade), staying in the Army, and leaving the Army. 
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The timing of events is also part of survival analysis. So, the time of promotion 
and separation must also be known, in addition to whether or not the event occurred. 
Thus, in survival analysis, subjects are observed during some time frame and occurrence 
and timing of events or changes are recorded. This study observes officers who were 
commissioned from 1981 to 2001, and the occurrence of promotion or separation is 
examined from 1981 to the year they leave the Army, or to 2004, which is the last year 
the officers are tracked.  
1.  The Reason for Using Survival Analysis 
Survival data have two common features that are difficult to handle with 
conventional statistical methods: censoring and time-dependent covariates.62  
Conventional statistical methods can estimate the occurrence of an event but cannot 
observe when the event occurred. For example, in a promotion model, one might put a 
ten year time limit on the occurrence of promotion and estimate promotion probability at 
the end of ten years. But, what about the officers who were promoted in less than ten 
years? They will also have a value of one (promoted), just the same as the other officers 
who were promoted at the end of the ten year period. In LOGIT or PROBIT models, the 
characteristics of officers who were promoted earlier will have the same importance for 
the outcome of the model as the characteristics of those who were promoted later. This 
might be overcome in those models by using dummy variables for time periods. But, if 
there are many time periods considered, say weeks over three years, then the model 
would need 156 dummy variables. There are too many dummy variables to adequately 
interpret a situation such as this. 
Because survival analysis analyzes the timing of the event, the characteristics of 
officers who were promoted earlier will be more effective in survival analysis, since both 
probability of promotion and time of promotion is important in survival analysis. In 
addition, all methods of survival analysis allow for censoring (discussed below) and 
many also allow for time-dependent covariates.63  
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2. Censoring 
If one observes the occurrence of an event from any time that the event can begin 
until a specific time, it is called right censored. The logic is that if, after this specific time, 
the occurrence of an event is not observed, the observation is then censored. Suppose that 
one observes five officers who were commissioned in 1981. The event is separation from 
the Army.  Some of the officers (three of them) separate during the time period from 
1981 to 2004, but some of them are still in the Army in 2004. One stops observing those 
officers in year 2004; therefore, it is unknown when they will separate. These officers’ 
separation time is right censored, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
  
1981               1990           2004 
(Year 0)                               (Year 23)   Right censoring 
Source: Author 
Figure 1.   Right Censoring 
 
Left censoring is the opposite of right censoring. In left censoring, one begins 
observing events after their occurrence has begun. Thus, one does not observe the events 
that occurred before the time observation began, and they are therefore left censored. 
There are three types of censoring according to their implementation: Type-I, 
Type-II and random censoring. The censoring explained in Figure 1 is Type-I censoring. 
In type-I censoring, the observation of events is stopped after some time. In the above 
example, it is stopped in year 2004, after 23 years of observation. 
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In Type-II censoring, the observation is stopped after a number of events has 
occurred. Suppose that one is observing the same five officers who were commissioned 
in 1981. The event is promotion, rather than separation.  Some of the officers have been 
promoted once, some have been promoted more than once, and some have never been 
promoted. Suppose that in this example one stops observing after two promotions have 
occurred. Thus, Type-I censoring can control the time, but Type-II censoring cannot 
control the time. One must wait until a specific number of events (in our example, it is 
two) occurs. So, in the example above, it is unknown at the beginning when two 
promotions are going to happen. Random censoring occurs when one has no control over 
the determination of when to stop observations. Random censoring can also happen when 
the entrance time of subjects differs, but the ending time of observations is fixed for 
everyone, whether the event has occurred or not. For example, in the separation example 
above, suppose that some of the officers were commissioned in different years (not all in 
1981), and one observes all of them until 2004. The entry time of subjects is thus out of 
one’s control in random sampling. 
3. Survival Distribution Functions 
The occurrence time of an event for an individual is a random variable that has a 
probability distribution. There are many different models for survival data, and what 
often distinguishes one model from another is the probability distribution.64 There are 
three types of distribution functions that are relevant: 
• Cumulative Distribution Function, 
• Probability Density Function, and 
• Hazard Function. 
The Cumulative Distribution Function shows the probability that the variable will 
be less than or equal to any value chosen. Survival analysis uses the Survivor Function 
instead of the Cumulative Distribution Function. The Survivor Function shows the 
probability that an event will occur. The value of the Survivor Function never increases 
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as time passes; instead, it decreases with time. The LIFETEST procedure, described 
below, examines this issue in greater detail. The Probability Density Function is just the 
slope of the Cumulative Density Function. Survival analysis uses this function more 
commonly than the Cumulative Density Function. Finally, the Hazard Function shows 
the probability of an event’s occurrence at any time. The Survivor Function, the 
Probability Density Function and the Hazard Function are equivalent ways of describing 
a continuous probability distribution.65 
This study uses three main procedures of survival analysis, using the SAS 
statistical software. They are the LIFETEST, LIFEREG and PHREG procedures. 
4. The LIFETEST Procedure in SAS 
The Proc LIFETEST procedure in SAS uses both the Kaplan-Meier method and 
the life-table method in order to find estimates of survivor functions. Both methods give 
the probability that a person will survive (stay or promote) until the time t+1, given that 
he or she has survived until the time t. It also shows the probability of not surviving 
(separate or not promote) during the same time frame. After time t+1 they are censored, 
because the results are unknown. The difference is that the Kaplan-Meier method gives 
probabilities for every observation in the sample, which is not suitable for a large data 
set, whereas the life-table method gives results by grouping observations based on the 
time differences, which is appropriate for large data sets. Since the data set is too large in 
this analysis, only the life-table method is used. Moreover, the life-table method produces 
estimates and plots of the hazard function.66 
The LIFETEST procedure also tests whether the survivor functions of different 
groups are the same or not. This study examines the survivor functions of officers with 
different education levels. For this test, PROC LIFETEST calculates two alternative 
statistics for testing this difference - the long-rank test and the Wilcoxon test.67 The 
likelihood ratio test is the third method for testing differences in survival functions that 
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the LIFETEST Procedure provides. This last test assumes that the event times have an 
exponential distribution. The LIFETEST procedure in SAS gives the p-values for these 
three tests.  
The LIFETEST procedure in SAS is useful for preliminary analysis of data. It 
also produces survivor function and hazard function graphs for different groups on the 
same figure for comparison. These graphs give some preliminary ideas about the survivor 
and hazard functions of different groups. 
5. The LIFEREG Procedure in SAS 
The LIFEREG Procedure produces estimates of parametric regression models 
with censored survival data using the method of maximum likelihood.68 PROC PHREG, 
which uses a partial likelihood method for doing semi-parametric regression analysis, has 
recently become popular. However, PROC LIFEREG is superior to PROC PHREG in 
several ways:69 
• PROC LIFEREG accommodates left censoring and interval censoring, 
while PROC PHREG allows only right censoring. 
• PROC LIFEREG allows testing for hypotheses about the shape of the 
hazard function, while PROC PHREG provides only non-parametric estimates of the 
survivor function, which can be difficult to interpret. 
• If the shape of the survival distribution is unknown, PROC LIFEREG 
produces more efficient estimates with smaller standard errors than PROC PHREG. 
• PROC LIFEREG automatically creates sets of dummy variables to 
represent categorical variables with multiple values, whereas PROC PHREG requires 
creating such variables in a data step. 
The biggest disadvantage of the LIFEREG procedure is that it is not capable of 
handling time dependent covariates, whereas the PHREG procedure can do this. On the 
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other hand, the ability to handle left and right censoring, and its rich array of survival 
distributions are the two greatest advantages of PROC LIFEREG.  
If the survival data had no censored values, the OLS regression and the LIFEREG 
Procedure in SAS with the log-normal distribution would give exactly the same results. 
The distributions used in LIFEREG are: 
• The Weibull Distribution, 
• The Exponential Distribution, 
• The Gamma Distribution, 
• The Log-logistic Distribution, and 
• The Log-normal Distribution. 
These distributions are named for the event time for each individual, rather than 
the distribution of error terms. The main reason for allowing five different types of 
models in PROC LIFEREG is that they have different implications for hazard functions 
that may, in turn, lead to different essential interpretations.70 
6. The PHREG Procedure in SAS 
PROC PHREG in SAS gives the Cox survival analysis results. It is the newest 
and most widely used survival model. The reason for its popularity is that it does not  
necessitate choosing some particular probability distribution to describe survival times. 
Other reasons include the following:71 
• The Cox regression model makes it easier to fit time dependent 
parameters. 
• The Cox regression model allows a kind of analysis that is very 
effective in controlling for nuisance variables. 
• The Cox regression model makes it easy to adjust for periods of 
time in which an individual is not at risk of an event. 
                                                 
70 Allison, 66. 
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• The Cox regression model readily accommodates both discrete and 
continuous measurement of event times. 
B. MODEL 
The model used for this study is based on the studies described in Chapter III. 
Analysis of the decision to leave the Army or continue to serve is one of the main 
purposes of this study.  Another purpose is to identify the factors affecting promotion to 
MAJOR rank (Grade 4). Based on previous studies, the candidate factors that affect the 
retention behavior and promotion to O-4 grade of US Army officers are chosen as 
follows: 
• Education Level (College graduation, master’s degree, doctorate 
graduation and professional degree) 
• Gender 
• Marital Status 
• Entry Age 
• Race-Ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Other Race) 
• Commissioning Source (United States Military Academy, Reserve 
Officers’ Training Corps, Officer Candidate School, and Direct Commission Officer) 
• Prior Enlistment Status 
• Military Occupational Specialty (Special Branches, Combat Arms, 
Combat Support,  Combat service support) 
• Commissioning Year as an Officer (From 1981 to 2001). 
The theoretical model can be written as follows for both the retention and 
promotion models: 
Hi (t) = λ0 (t)*exp f (Educational Level, Entry Age, Race-Ethnicity, Commissioning 
Source, Marital Status, Gender, Prior Enlisted Status, Occupation Category, Entry Year). 
The only difference between the models is the dependent (time + censoring) 
variables. For the retention model it will be the officer’s staying status (whether an 
officer stayed until 2004) and time to separation, and for the promotion model it will be 
promotion status (whether an officer is promoted to O-4) and time to promotion.  
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C. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
 Two main variables are combined to create the dependent variable in survival 
analysis - duration and the censoring variable. Duration is a variable that shows how long 
it takes for an officer to leave the Army or how long it takes to be promoted to MAJOR. 
The duration variable in this study is called YEARSSERVED for the retention model and 
TIMEYRS for the promotion model.  
The censoring variable for the retention model is STAY, which shows whether 
the officer stayed in the Army until 2004. For the promotion model the censoring variable 
is PROMO4, which shows whether an officer was promoted to MAJOR. Table 5 shows 
definitions of dependent, duration, and censoring variables. Table 6 shows definitions of 
the explanatory variables. 
The variable definitions used in this study are based on Bowman and Mehay, and 
Doganca. Some of the variables were tracked yearly until 2004, such as educational level 
and marital status. For such variables in the retention model, the last observed value is 
used. In the promotion model, the value at the tenth year is used. 
1. Education Variables 
Educational level is the main explanatory variable in this study. Four binary 
variables are used to show the education level of Army officers in this thesis: college 
degree (COLLEGEDEGREE), master’s degree (GRADUATEDEGREE), doctorate 
degree (DOCTORATEDEGREE), and first professional degree 
(PROFESSIONALDEGREE). College degree as used in this study is defined as a 
baccalaureate or four-year college degree.  
Most of the previous studies found that advanced education has a positive effect 
on both retention and promotion. For the retention model, all education level data is for 
the last observed education level (at separation or in 2004, if still on active duty in 2004). 
For the promotion model, it is the observation at the promotion year if an officer is 
promoted to MAJOR rank. If an officer is not promoted to O-4 grade, then the education 




Table 5.   Variable Definitions 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
     DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
YEARSSERVED  
(RETENTION MODEL)             




NUMBER OF YEARS TO BE PROMOTED TO O-4 
FROM COMMISSIONING YEAR   
     CENSORING VARIABLES 
STAY  = 1 IF STILL IN THE SERVICE 
(RETENTION MODEL)     = 0 IF LEFT THE SERVICE 
PROMO4 = 1 PROMOTED TO 0-4 GRADE (MAJOR) 
(PROMOTION MODEL) = 0 OTHERWISE 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
   INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
     EDUCATION VARIABLES
COLLEGEDEGREE = 1 IF HAS COLLEGE DEGREE  (BASE CASE) 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
GRADUATEDEGREE = 1 IF HAS MASTERS DEGREE 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
DOCTORATEDEGREE = 1 IF HAS DOCTORATE DEGREE 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
PROFESSIONALDEGREE = 1 IF HAS PROFESSIONAL DEGREE 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
     DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
     GENDER 
FEMALE = 1 IF FEMALE 
 = 0 IF MALE (BASE CASE) 
         MARITAL STATUS 
MARRIED = 1 IF MARRIED 
 = 0 IF SINGLE (BASE CASE) 
     ENTRY AGE   
ENTRYAGE AGE AT THE ENTRY TO THE ARMY 
       RACE/ETHNICITY 
WHITE = 1 IF WHITE (BASECASE) 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
BLACK = 1 IF BLACK 
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VARIABLE DEFINITION 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
HISPANIC = 1 IF HISPANIC 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
OTHERRACE = 1 IF OTHER RACE 
 = 0 OTHERWISE  
 COMMISIONING SORCE 
ACADEMY = 1 IF COMMISSIONING SOURCE IS USMA 
(BASE CASE) 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ROTCSCHOLAR 
 
= 1 IF COMMISSIONING SOURCE IS ROTC 
SCHOLARSHIP 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ROTCNONSCHOLAR 
 
= 1 IF COMMISSIONING SOURCE IS ROTC 
CONTRACT 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
OTHERSOURCE = 1 IF COMMISSIONING SOURCE IS OTHER 
THAN ACADEMY OR ROTC
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
     PRIOR ENLISTMENT STATUS 
PREENLIST = 1 IF PRIOR ENLISTED 
 = 0 OTHERWISE (BASE CASE) 
 MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY 
COMBATARMS = 1 IF IN COMBAT ARMS FIELD (BASE CASE) 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
COMBATSUPPORT = 1 IF IN COMBAT SUPPORT FIELD 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
COMBATSERVICESUPPORT = 1 IF IN COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FIELD 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
SPECIALBRANCHES = 1 IF IN SPECIAL BRANCHES FIELD 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
                COMMISSIONING YEARS  (CONTROL VARIABLES) 
ENTRYYR81 
 
= 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1981 (BASE 
CASE) 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR82 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1982 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR83 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1983 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
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VARIABLE DEFINITION 
ENTRYYR84 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1984 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR85 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1985 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR86 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1986 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR87 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1987 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR88 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1988 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR89 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1989 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR90 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1990 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR91 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1991 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR92 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1992 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR93 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1993 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR94 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1994 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR95 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1995 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR96 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1996 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR97 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1997 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR98 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1998 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR99 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 1999 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR00 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 2000 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
ENTRYYR01 = 1 IF COMMISSIONING YEAR IS 2001 
 = 0 OTHERWISE 
Source: Author 
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Branigan (2001) stated that since an officer who spent his or her time getting a 
graduate degree would be away from his normal career path, and therefore would have 
received unobserved fitness reports, he or she might have been less likely to be 
promoted.72 Furthermore,  an officer who is away from work pursuing a graduate degree 
may not be able to obtain enough experience for a higher command level, which may  
also decrease his or her probability of being promoted to O-4. Moreover, the probability 
of finding a job in the civilian labor market increases with graduate education. Officers 
with professional degrees have specialized jobs, such as doctors or lawyers, which are 
much sought after in the civilian labor market, and which have high civilian earnings. On 
the other hand, an officer who attended graduate school instead of doing a daily job 
obtains new skills. Thus, advanced education might increase officers’ abilities.  In 
addition, officers owe service obligations when their education costs are paid by military. 
After serving more than ten years because of service obligations, officers might prefer 
continuing to serve until their retirements in order to obtain the benefits of retirement. 
Although advanced education might have both negative and positive effects on 
retention and promotion, it is hypothesized that the advantages of graduate education for 
military life outweigh the disadvantages, and it is expected that advanced education will 
have a positive effect on both retention and promotion probabilities of Army officers. 
Literature supports this assumption. Buterbaugh (1995), Wielsma (1996), Bowman and 
Mehay (1998), Branigan (2001), and Kizilkaya (2004) all found that graduate education 
had a positive effect on promotion. In addition, Wielsma (1996), Branigan (2001), and 
Doganca (2006) found that graduate education had a positive effect on retention.  
2. Demographic Variables  
FEMALE is a gender variable which is equal to one if an officer is female and 
zero if male. Male is the base case. In the literature, there are instances of positive, 
negative and insignificant relationships between being female and retention or promotion. 
Buterbaugh (1995) found a negative relationship between being female and promotion to 
O-5 and no significant relationship between being female and promotion to O-6. Mehay 
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and Bowman (1998) and Branigan (2001) found that being female had a positive effect 
on promotion. Wielsma (1996), Kabalar (2003) and Kizilkaya (2004) found no 
significant relationship between being female and promotion. Fagan (2002) and Doganca 
(2006) found that females are less likely to be retained in the military than males. 
According to Wielsma (1996), women would be more likely to stay in the 
military, if they were not as responsible for child care.73 Browman and Mehay mentioned 
that women in the Navy had been prevented from line duties, which keeps them from 
acquiring the best firm-specific skills.74 Military personnel change duty location 
frequently, which might not be suitable for women and may cause women to stay in the 
Army for a shorter time. Finally, because of career interruptions due to family reasons, 
such as giving  birth, childcare, home care, and husband’s job location (if husband is not 
in the military), female officers are hypothesized to survive a shorter time than male 
officers and are assumed to be less likely to be promoted to grade O-4. 
The variable MARRIED shows the marital status of an officer, which is a variable 
tracked yearly in the dataset. Thus, it has different definitions for the two models. For the 
retention model, it is equal to one if the last observed value is equal to MARRIED, and 
zero if single (single, divorced or widowed). For the promotion model, it is equal to one 
if an officer is married at the time of promotion, or if not promoted to O-4, then if the 
officer married at the last observed time, and zero otherwise. Single is the base case.  
Almost all of the studies mentioned in this thesis found a positive relationship between 
being married and retention and promotion.   
Wielsma (1996) mentions in his thesis that marriage is a life-cycle decision. It 
could thus be hypothesized that if an officer was ready for marriage, that officer might be 
ready for some other life-cycle decisions, such as remaining in the Army and having the 
advantages of military life.75 According to Branigan (2001), married officers are more 
likely to remain in the Marine Corps because of job security, and they are more motivated 
                                                 
73 Wielsma, 27. 
74 Bowman and Mehay, 456. 
75 Wielsma, 28. 
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than single officers to perform well. Furthermore, marriage might increase productivity 
because married people have more stable lives. Finally, married officers have 
responsibilities to their families . Thus, being married is hypothesized to increase the 
probability of staying longer in the Army and being promoted to O-4. 
ENTRYAGE is a continuous variable that shows the age of an officer at entry into 
the Armed Forces. In the literature, both positive and negative relationships are found 
between age and promotion or retention. According to Wielsma, the older an individual 
is, the more likely he or she is to stay in the same job.76 According to Branigan (2001),77 
older officers at commissioning time might be more productive because of their maturity, 
but younger officers may have a stronger taste for the military because of their earlier 
entry to the military.78 Finally, as age increases, people hope for a more stable life and 
they find the job that best matches their characteristics and expectations. It is 
hypothesized that officers whose ages at entry are older will stay longer and be more 
likely to be promoted to O-4.  
There are four race/ethnicity variables in this study, WHITE, BLACK, 
HISPANIC and OTHERRACE. Each one of these variables takes a value of one 
according to the officer’s race/ethnicity. WHITE is the base case. The variable 
OTHERRACE shows any other race/ethnicity than WHITE, BLACK or HISPANIC. The 
base case is WHITE.  According to Fagan, it should be expected that racial differences 
will have no significant effect on the retention and promotion of Army officers, because 
of the equality of opportunity in the military. However, Doganca (2006) hypothesizes that 
minorities should be expected to stay longer than Whites because of the more equal pay 
and education opportunities available in the military compared with the civilian sector.79 
Because there is discrimination against minorities in the civilian sector, those officers are 
expected to stay longer in the Army, an organization in which there is less discrimination. 
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Lieutenant Commander Of Naval Flight Officers,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
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Furthermore, Blacks and other minorities might expect to be promoted to higher ranks in 
accordance with their performance levels in the military, because of the greater equality. 
In this thesis, Whites are expected to separate earlier than minorities, since they can find 
jobs more easily and have greater carrier opportunities in the civilian labor market.  
Finally, it is hypothesized that whites are more likely to be promoted. The literature 
supports this idea: Mehay and Bowman, as well as Buterbaugh found that being white 
has a positive effect on promotion. 
3. Commissioning Source Variables 
Four commissioning source variables are used in this study: United States 
Military Academy (ACADEMY), Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (student uses 
scholarship) (ROTCSCHOLAR), Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (no scholarship) 
(ROTCNONSCHOLAR), and sources other than those three (OTHERSOURCE), such as 
officer candidate school. ACADEMY is the base case. In the literature, almost all of the 
studies found that being a Military Academy graduate had a positive effect on both 
retention and promotion.  Army ROTC trains individuals and provides them experiences 
they need to become Officers in the U.S. Army.80 It is an elective college curriculum for 
college students and taken with some other courses.81 Students enrolled in this 
curriculum at universities may do so by using Army scholarships. If they use 
scholarships, they have to serve fulltime for at least three years in the Army.82 
Wielsma mentions that an officer who obtains his or her college degree from a 
military institution and who teaches military skills would be more experienced in his or 
her duties. Thus, these officers might more likely be promoted.83 According to Mehay 
and Bowman, military academy students’ four-year attendance at a military school 
                                                 
80 The United States Army Webpage, “Army ROTC”, <http://www.goarmy.com/rotc/index.jsp>, 
(accessed January 15, 2007). 
81  The United States Army Webpage, “Army ROTC”, 
<http://www.goarmy.com/rotc/about_army_index.jsp>,  (accessed January 15, 2007). 
82 The United States Army Webpage, “Army ROTC”, <http://www.goarmy.com/rotc>,  (accessed 
January 15, 2007). 
83 Wielsma, 23. 
 55
increases their ability to assimilate into the military’s team production environment.84 
Following graduation, they may be able to adapt to the military job environment as an 
officer more rapidly and easily. Branigan states that U.S. Naval academy and ROTC 
graduates begin taking military firm-specific training during their college years.85 
According to Fagan, since USNA graduates attend college in order to serve as naval 
officers for their country, they become familiar with Navy core values for four years, and 
thus they are more likely to stay and be promoted.86 Finally, the graduates of USNA 
undertake a difficult education and training program during their academy years. This 
might be a kind of screening for those officers. Graduating from such a difficult school 
might show that they have dedicated themselves to the military life. For these reasons, in 
this study it is hypothesized that USMA graduates have the greatest probability of staying 
in the Army and being promoted to O-4.   
4.  Prior Enlistment Status Variable 
PREENLIST is a variable that shows the officer’s prior enlisted situation. It takes 
on a value of one if an officer served as an enlisted member before being commissioned 
as an officer, and zero otherwise. Officers who were not enlisted before being 
commissioned as an officer are the base case. According to Branigan (2001), officers 
who were enlisted serve four more years in order to get firm-specific training.87 
According to Fagan (2002), enlisted personnel get recommendations from their 
supervisors for acceptance into one of the accession pipelines, which shows that the 
enlistee is hard-working and determined.88 Korkmaz (2005) states that since prior 
enlisted officers have already adapted to military life, they are more likely to stay longer 
in the Army.89 Finally, prior enlisted officers choose to become officers voluntarily after 
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their experience in the Army for several years. In this study, it is expected that prior 
enlisted officers remain in the Army longer and are more likely to be promoted to O-4. 
5. Military Occupational Specialty Variables 
There are four Military Occupational Categories used for the analysis in this 
thesis: Combat Arms Field (COMBATARMS), Combat Support Field 
(COMBATSUPPORT), Combat Service Support (COMBATSERVICESUPPORT), and 
Special Branches (SPECIALBRANCHES). Each of these variables takes a value of one 
if an officer serves in that field, and zero otherwise. The base case is COMBATARMS.  
The variables above are Career Branch Categories. In Department of the Army 
Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management, it is 
stated that “A branch is a grouping of officers that comprises an arm or service of the 
Army in which, as a minimum, officers are commissioned, assigned, developed and 
promoted through their company grade years.”90 According to the same Army Pamphlet, 
the branch categories in the Army are:91  
• Combat arms branches (Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense 
Artillery, Aviation, Special Forces and Corps of Engineers); 
• The combat support branches (Signal Corps, Military Police Corps, 
Military Intelligence Corps, Civil Affairs and Chemical Corps); 
• The combat service support branches (Adjutant General Corps, Finance 
Corps, Transportation Corps, Ordnance Corps and Quartermaster Corps); and 
• The special branches (The Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Chaplain 
Corps, Medical Corps, Dental Corps, Veterinary Corps, Army Medical Specialists, Army 
Nurse Corps and Medical Service Corps). 
Combat arms field officers are hypothesized to remain in the Army longer since 
they have more firm-specific training than officers in other categories. Furthermore, 
combat arms officers have a lower probability of finding better civilian jobs because the 
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Management, (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2005), 68. 
91 Ibid., 68,69 
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abilities they acquire in the military are less likely to be applicable in civilian jobs. In 
addition, they are expected to be more likely to be promoted to O-4, because of their 
firm-specific education levels and abilities.   
6. Commissioning Years (Control Variables) 
In order to control for trends in retention and promotion over time, 
commissioning year is used as a control variable.92 Commissioning year shows the year 
in which an officer began service as an officer, from 1981 to 2001. ENTRYYR81 is the 
base case.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Survival analysis is used as an empirical analysis method for this study. Survival 
analysis is a class of statistical methods for studying the occurrence and timing of 
events.93  The reason for using survival analysis is to analyze the timing of the event 
(promotion and retention). Thus, the characteristics of people who were promoted earlier 
will be more effective in survival analysis. The three main SAS Procedures used are 
LIFETEST, LIFEREG, and PHREG. 
Two main variables are combined to create the dependent variable in survival 
analysis - duration and the censoring variable. The duration variable for the retention 
model is YEARSSERVED, which shows how long it takes an officer to leave the Army. 
It is TIMEYRS for the promotion model, which shows how long it takes to be promoted 
to MAJOR. There are two censoring variables: STAY for the retention model (whether 
an officer stayed in the army until 2004), and PROMO4 (whether an officer was 
promoted to MAJOR rank). 
The main focus of this thesis is the effect of education level on retention and 
promotion. It is hypothesized that master’s, doctorate and professional degrees all have 
positive effects on both retention and promotion. Hypothesized effects for all of the 
explanatory variables in the models are summarized in Table.6. 
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Table 6.   Hypothesized Effects of Independent Variables 
VARIABLE RETENTION MODEL PROMOTION MODEL 
EDUCATION  VARIABLES 
COLLEGEDEGREE BASE BASE 
GRADUATEDEGREE + + 
DOCTORATEDEGREE + + 
PROFESSIONALDEGREE + + 
 DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
FEMALE - - 
MARRIED + + 
ENTRYAGE + + 
WHITE BASE BASE 
BLACK + - 
HISPANIC + - 
OTHERRACE + - 
 COMMISIONING SORCE 
ACADEMY BASE BASE 
ROTCSCHOLAR - - 
ROTCNONSCHOLAR - - 
OTHERSOURCE - - 
 PRIOR ENLISTED STATUS 
PREENLIST + + 
MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL  SPECIALTY 
COMBATARMS BASE BASE 
COMBATSUPPORT - - 
COMBATSERVICESUPPORT - - 
SPECIALBRANCHES - - 
Source: Author 
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V. DATA AND PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter describes the data set used for the analysis and presents the 
preliminary data analysis. It first explains the source of the data and then defines the data 
elements. Descriptive statistics are presented in two subsections. One subsection 
discusses retention statistics and one addresses promotion statistics. The reason for 
having two different subsections of statistics is that there are some differences in 
characteristics of samples used for retention and promotion analysis. Finally, this chapter 
addresses limitations of the data. 
A. DATA 
The data set used for this thesis is created from the Active Duty Military Master 
File, which is provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. The data provide 
information about cohorts of Army officers who were commissioned between 1981 and 
2001. Although the data set includes information on more than 100,000 officers, only 
45,228 observations are used for retention analysis, and 12,092 for promotion analysis. 
This is because of missing and unknown values in some of the data fields.  
Since each officer must hold at least a baccalaureate degree,94 those observations 
that contained incorrect education level information (e.g., observations showing that 
officer’s education level is less than a college degree) were deleted. While forming the 
data set, it also became clear that some of the observations did not contain valid pay 
grade progression information. Those officers with incomplete data for pay grade were 
also deleted from the analysis. 
The variables for gender, age at entry, race/ethnicity, commissioning source, prior 
enlisted status and military occupational specialty are constant for each individual and do 
not change over time. However, the variables for education level and marital status 
change yearly, and those variables are therefore tracked yearly from the person’s entry 
into the Army until the separation year or, if he or she did not leave the Army, until 2004. 
                                                 
94 Army Regulation 135–155 Promotion of Commissioned Officers and Warrant Officers Other Than 
General Officers (Washington DC, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 13 July 2004), 4. 
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Retention analysis uses the last observed value for those variables. Promotion analysis 
uses the value at promotion date if an officer is promoted to MAJOR (O-4). However, if 
the officer is not promoted to O-4, then the last observed value is used. (Note: Officers 
who are not promoted to O-4 are censored in the survival analysis.) 
B. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Retention 
All characteristic distribution and retention rates by the independent variables are 
summarized on the table in Appendix A.  The table presents all independent variables, 
their distribution among officers, separation and continuation rates according to the 
explanatory variable, both in numbers and percentages. 
YEARSSERVED is the duration variable for the retention model. It shows time 
of service in years. Service years show how many years an officer served until separation. 
Service years are measured from the commissioning year until separation for those who 
left the Army before September 30, 2004. For those who were still on active duty on that 
date, it is measured from the commissioning year to September 30, 2004. Figure 2 shows 
the number of officers by service years. As seen in the figure, the biggest group is the 
officers who serve six years. Officers with seven years service time are the second 
biggest group.  
The censoring variable for the retention model is STAY. Officers who were still 
on active duty on September 30, 2004 were censored, their separation time or service 




































 Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 2.   Number of Officers by Service Years 
 
Figure 3 shows the number and percentage of officers in the data set who left the 
Army before 2004, as well as the number who were still on active duty in 2004. Of 
45,228 officers used for the analysis, 33,232 (73 percent) were still on active duty on 
September 30, 2004, and 11,996 (27 percent) had left the Army by that date. However, 
because of the nature of the survival analysis, officers who were still in the Army in 2004 
were censored and there is no information about their separation dates. The observation 
of officers’ retention behavior stops in 2004. Furthermore, these figures do not indicate a 
retention decision on the part of all officers. Those who entered in the early cohort years 
would have been forced to retire, while those who entered in the last years would not 
have been able to leave, since they were still serving their obligated service period. The 
potential influence of the censored data means no precise conclusions can be drawn95  
from the numbers shown in these tables and figures. 
As explained in Chapter III, the LIFETEST procedure in SAS is useful for 
preliminary analysis of data. It produces survivor function and hazard function graphs for 
                                                 
95 Phillip Hoglin, “Survival Analysis and Accession Optimization of Prior Enlisted United States 
Marine Corps Officers,” (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2004), 35. 
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all officers on one figure, and for different groups on the same figure for comparison.96 
These graphs give some preliminary ideas about the survivor and hazard functions of 
different groups. Chapter VI examines survivor times and separation times in a more 







Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 3.   Number and Percentage of Officers Entering the Army between 1981-
2004 Who Had Separated by September 30, 2004 
 
Figure 4 shows separation rate by years of service. The largest percentage of 
separations are in years 4 (18.36 percent) and 5 (16.73 percent).  The reason for this is 
that the end of service obligation usually occurs in the fourth or fifth year, depending on 
the commissioning program.  After the fifth year, the separation rate decreases until the 
twentieth year. There is an increase in separation rates at year 20 (4.83 percent), because 
officers are typically eligible for retirement. 
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Figure 4.   Separation Rate of Army Officers by Service Years 
 
Figure 5 displays the education level of officers, which is the main focus of this 
study. There are four education levels investigated in this study: college (baccalaureate) 
degree (COLLEGEDGREE), master's degree (GRADUATEDEGREE), doctorate degree 
(DOCTORATEDEGREE) and professional degree (PROFESSIONALDEGREE).  
Education level may change over time, and it is tracked yearly in the data set. Education 
level used for the analysis is measured at the time of separation if an officer left the Army 
by 2004. If an officer was still on active duty in September 2004, then the education level 
observed on that date is used. The majority of the officers (26,781 or 59 percent) are 
college graduates. The smallest group is the doctorate degree holders, accounting for only 
1 percent of all officers. The second largest group is the officers with a master's degree, 
of which there are 13,403, or 30 percent of all officers. Finally, there are 4,612 officers 












Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 5.   Education Level of Army Officers in Numbers and Percentages 
 
Figure 6 shows separation and continuation rates as of September 30, 2004 by 
education level for officers who entered commissioned service between 1981 and 2004. 
Master's degree holders have the lowest separation rates (13.62 percent), whereas college 
graduates have the highest rate (32.07 percent).  Thus, master's degree holders have the 
greatest survival rate (86.38 percent). College graduates and professional degree holders 
have approximately the same separation rates, 32.07 percent and 32.18 percent, 














































Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 6.   Separation and Continuation Percentages as of September 30, 2004 by 
Education Level for All Army Officers Entering 1981-2004 
 
Figure 7 shows both the number and percentage of officers according to their 
gender. Of 45,228 officers, 38,147 are males (about 84 percent) and 7,081 are females 

























Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 7.   Gender of Officers in Numbers (and Percent) 
 
Figure 8 displays separation rates by gender. While 75.13 percent of males who 
entered the Army as officers between 1981 and 2004 were still in service in 2004, this 
rate was 64.57 percent for females. In other words, 24.87 percent of males and 35.43 








































Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 8.   Separation and Continuation Rates as of September 30, 2004 by Gender 
for All Army Officers Entering 1981-2004 
 
Figure 9 shows the marital status of officers both in numbers and percentages.  
Marital status is a variable that may change over time; thus, it is tracked yearly. For the 
retention model, this variable shows marital status at separation date if an officer left the 
Army by September 30, 2004. If an officer was still in service on September 30, 2004, 
then it shows marital status on that date. There are 33,788 married officers and 11,140 


















MARRIED , 33,788 
(75%)
 
Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 9.   Marital Status of Army Officers in Numbers (and Percent) 
 
Figure10 displays separation rates by marital status. The separation rate of single 
officers is greater than that of married officers (38 percent vs. 23 percent). By 2004, 77 
percent of married officers were still on active duty. For single officers this rate was 62 





































Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 10.   Separation and Continuation Percentages as of September 30, 2004 by 
Marital Status for All Army Officers Entering 1981-2004 
 
Age at entry for the Army officers in the data set ranges from 17 to 35, as seen in 
Figure 11. The modal age at the entry is 22 (32.25 percent).  The majority of the officers 


















Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 11.   Age of Army Officers at Entry 
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Figure 12 shows the race/ethnicity distribution of the officers. The majority of 
officers are whites, comprising 78 percent of all officers. The second largest group is 
blacks, comprising 12 percent of officers. The smallest group is Hispanics, who number 







OTHER RACE, 2,511 
(6%)
 
Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 12.   Race/Ethnicity of Army Officers in Numbers (and Percent)  
 
Figure 13 provides information about variation in separation rates among different 
race/ethnicity groups. Although there seems to be little difference in separation 
percentages among different race/ethnicity groups, the separation rate of whites and other 
races is the largest at 27 percent. The group with the second largest separation rate is 
Hispanics, with a separation rate of 24 percent. Black officers have the highest survival 
rates among all race/ethnicity groups. Their separation rate is 22 percent and survival rate 


































Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 13.   Separation and Continuation Rates as of September 30, 2004 by 
Race/Ethnicity for All Army Officers Entering 1981-2004 
 
Figure 14 displays the commissioning sources of officers. The largest 
commissioning source is Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC). The number of 
ROTC non-scholarship officers is 14,643 and they comprise 32 percent of all officers. 
ROTC scholarship officers follow the non-scholarship officers with 12,599 officers, 
about 28 percent. United States Military Academy graduates are the smallest group, 
accounting for 18 percent. The number of officers who were commissioned from any 




















Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 14.   Commissioning Sources of Army Officers in Numbers (and Percent) 
 
Figure 15 provides information on separation rates by commissioning source. 
Officers whose commissioning source is an ROTC scholarship have the largest 
separation rate (33 percent).  Academy graduates follow this group with 32 percent. The 
group with the third highest separation rate is those commissioned from another source, 
with a rate of 26 percent. ROTC non-scholarships have the smallest separation rate (19 
percent) and thus, have the highest survival rate (81 percent).  
Figure 16 provides information about the prior enlistment status of officers. About 













































Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 15.   Separation and Continuation Rates as of September 30, 2004 by 










Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 16.   Number (and Percentage) of Army Officers by Prior Enlistment Status 
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Figure 17 shows separation rates by prior enlistment status. As seen in the figure, 
the separation rate of officers who were not prior enlisted is greater than that of officers 



























Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 17.   Separation and Continuation Rates as of September 30, 2004 by Prior 
Enlistment Status for All Army Officers Entering 1981-2004  
 
Figure 18 shows the number of officers by their occupational specialties. The 
majority of the officers (59 percent) serve in the Combat Arms Specialty, and they 
number 26,758.  Officers who serve in Special Branches and in the Combat Service 
Support Category number 9,727 (22 percent) and 5,420 (12 percent), respectively. The 
smallest group among these four categories is the Combat Support Group, whose number 











 Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 18.   Number (and Percentage) of Army Officers by Military Occupational 
Specialty (MOS) 
 
Figure 19 shows separation and continuation rates by occupational categories. 
Special Branches Category has the highest separation rate (31 percent). This category is 
followed by Combat Support and Combat Service Support, with separation rates of 29 
percent and 27 percent respectively. The smallest separation rate is 25 percent for the 




















































Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 19.   Separation and Continuation Rates as of September 30, 2004 by Military 
Occupational Specialty for All Army Officers Entering 1981-2004 
 
2. Promotion 
The table in Appendix B summarizes all characteristic distribution and promotion 
rates by the independent variables.  This table presents all independent variables, their 
distribution among officers, and promotion rates according to the explanatory variables in 
both numbers and percentages. 
The duration variable for the promotion model is TIMEYRS, which shows how 
long it takes officers to be promoted to MAJOR (O-4). It shows number of years until 
separation or until September 30, 2004 for those who were not promoted to major. 
According to Department of Defense Instruction 1320.14, Commissioned Officer 
Promotion Program Procedures97, an officer should serve nine to eleven years in order 
to be promoted to O-4. Officers promoted below the zone have eight years of service. 
Furthermore, according to Army Regulation 600-8-29, Officer Promotions98 and Army 
                                                 
97 Department of Defense Instruction 1320.14, Commissioned Officer Promotion Program 
Procedures, (Washington DC, Headquarters, Department of Defense, September 24, 1996). 
98 Army Regulation 600-8-29, Officer Promotions (Department of the Army Headquarters, 
Washington DC, 25 February 2005). 
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Regulation 135-155, Promotion of Commissioned Officers and Warrant Officers Other 
Than General Officers,99 an officer must serve at least two years as a second lieutenant in 
order to be promoted to lieutenant, at least two years in order to be promoted to captain, 
and at least three years in order to be promoted to major. Thus, an officer must serve at 
least seven years in the lower ranks in order to be promoted to major. For these reasons, 
only officers who served at least eight years are used for the analysis. Those who left 
before eight years of service or those who did not serve at least eight years by September 
30, 2004 are deleted. As a result, officers commissioned after 1996 are not used for the 
analysis. 
The censoring variable for promotion analysis is PROMO4. It takes on a value of 
one if an officer is promoted to O-4 by September 30, 2004. It takes on a value of zero if 
an officer was not promoted to major by that date or if an officer left the service after 
serving at least eight years but was not promoted to O-4. Thus, officers who were not 
promoted to major for any reason are censored.  
Figure 20 shows the number of years it takes to be promoted to major. As seen in 
the figure, the majority of officers (61.33 percent) are promoted after serving 12 years. 
The second largest group is the officers promoted to major after serving 13 years (25.24 
percent). The third group is represented by those promoted after 11 years (11.66 percent). 
There are a few officers promoted to O-4 after serving 8 years (0.07 percent), 9 years 
(0.19 percent), 10 years (1.01 percent), 14 years (0.40 percent), 15 years (0.06 percent) or 





                                                 
99 Army Regulation 135-155, Promotion of Commissioned Officers and Warrant Officers Other Than 
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Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 20.   Promotion Rates to MAJOR by Years of Service for all Army Officers 
Entering 1981- 1985 
 
Figure 21 displays the number and percentage of officers promoted and not 
promoted to major. The promotion analysis contained 12,092 officers who were 
commissioned between 1981 and 1995 and who survived to eight years of service.. Of 
those 12,092 officers, 6,742 (56 percent) officers were promoted to O-4 and 5,350 (44 
percent) officers were not promoted to O-4 by September 30, 2004. Officers who were 
not promoted are censored in survival analysis. Some of those censored officers left the 
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6,742 (56%)
NOT PROMOTED TO 
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Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 21.   Number and Percentage of Officers Entering the Army between 1981 and 
1995 Who Were Promoted to O-4 by September 30, 2006 
 
Figure 22 displays the education level of officers used for promotion analysis. 
Education level is measured at the time of promotion if an officer was promoted to major 
by 2004. If an officer was not promoted by September 30, 2004 or left the service before 
that time without being promoted to O-4, then the education level observed on September 
30, 2004 or on the separation date is used. The majority of the officers (8,282 or 68 
percent) are college graduates. Doctorate degree holders comprise the smallest group, 
accounting for only less than 1 percent of all officers (20 officers). Officers with a 
master's degree account for the second largest group, totaling 3,698 and comprising 31 
percent of all officers. Finally, there are 92 officers who have professional degrees. They 

















Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 22.   Education Level of Army Officers in Numbers (and Percent) 
 
Figure 23 shows promotion rates as of September 30, 2004 by education level for 
officers who entered commissioned service between 1981 and 1995. Professional degree 
holders have the highest promotion rates (88.04 percent), whereas college graduates have 
the lowest rate (44.94 percent). Of officers with master's degrees, 79.10 percent were 
promoted to O-4. Finally, 70 percent of officers with doctorate degrees were promoted to 
major. There seems to be a substantial difference in promotion rates between officers 
with advanced degrees (master's, doctorate and professional degrees) and officers with 




































































Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 23.   Promotion Rates of Army Officers Entering the Army between 1981 and 
1995 by Education Level, as of September 30, 2004 
 
Figure 24 displays the number and percentage of officers according to their 
gender. Of 12,092 officers in the promotion analysis, 10,448 are male (86 percent) and 














Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 24.   Gender of Army Officers in Numbers and Percentages 
 
Figure 25 shows the promotion rates of officers by gender as of September 30, 
2004. While 56.5 percent of male officers were promoted to O-4, 51.2 percent of female 
























Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 25.   Promotion Rates as of September 30, 2004 by Gender for Army Officers 
Entering 1981-1995 
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Figure 26 displays marital status of officers both in numbers and in percentages. 
Marital status is a variable that is tracked yearly. For the promotion model this variable 
shows marital status at promotion date if an officer was promoted to O-4 by September 
30, 2004. If an officer was not promoted to major by that date and was still in service, or 
separated from the Army by September 30, 2004, then it shows marital status on 
September 30, 2004 or on the separation date. There are 9,934 married officers and 2,158 








Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 26.   Marital Status of Army Officers in Number and Percentage  
 
Figure 27 shows promotion rates for officers as of September 30, 2004 by marital 
status. While 59 percent of married officers were promoted to O-4, only 40.9 percent of 
single officers were promoted to major. The promotion percentage for married officers is 
























Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 27.   Promotion Rates as of September 30, 2004 by Marital Status for Army 
Officers Entering 1981-1995 
 
Age at entry for the Army officers in the data set ranges from 17 to 35, as seen in 
Figure 28. The modal age at entry is 22 (40 percent).  The majority of the officers (74 
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Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 28.   Age of Army Officers at Entry 
 
Figure 29 shows the race/ethnicity distribution of the officers. The majority of 
officers are white, making up 84 percent of all officers. The second largest group is black, 
comprising 11 percent of officers. The smallest group is Hispanics, who number 215      

















OTHER RACE, 401 
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Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 29.   Race/Ethnicity of Army Officers in Numbers and Percentages 
 
White officers have the greatest promotion rate, as seen in Figure 30. Of white 
officers, 56.6 percent were promoted to major. Hispanics have the lowest rate, which is 
48.8 percent. The group with the second highest promotion rate is officers whose 
race/ethnicity is other than the main three, with a promotion rate of 52.9 percent. Black 
officers have the third highest promotion rate at 51 percent. There seems to be little 































Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 30.   Promotion Rates as of September 30, 2004 by Race/Ethnicity for Army 
Officers Entering 1981-1995 
 
Figure 31 displays the commissioning sources of officers. The largest 
commissioning source is Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC). The number of 
ROTC non-scholarship officers is 5,566 and they comprise 47 percent of all officers. U.S. 
Military Academy graduates follow the non-scholarship officers with 2,801 officers, 
about 23 percent.  ROTC scholarship officers are the third largest group, totaling 2,216 
(18 percent).  The number of officers who were commissioned from any source other 
than these three major sources is 1,509 (12 percent), and they are the smallest group 
among officers commissioned between 1981 and 1995.  Other sources include Officer 
Candidate School (OCS), direct appointments and the “Green-to-Gold Program.” This 






members who have served at least two years. These enlisted personnel can request 
discharge from active duty and enroll in ROTC. After graduating from college, they are 














Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 31.   Commissioning Source of Army Officers in Numbers and Percentages 
 
Figure 32 provides information on promotion rates by commissioning source. 
Officers whose commissioning source is other than the three major sources have the 
highest promotion rate (61.2 percent).  Academy graduates follow them with 56.5 
percent. The group with the third highest promotion rate is ROTC non-scholar officers, 







                                                 
100 Michael R.Thirtle, Educational Benefits and Officer-Commissioning Opportunities Available to 

































Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 32.   Promotion Rates as of September 30, 2004 by Commissioning Source for 
Army Officers Entering 1981-1995 
 
Figure 33 shows the rates of prior enlisted officers. Of 12,092 officers, 2,578 (21 
percent) were prior enlisted and 9,514 (79 percent) had not served as enlisted before 
















Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 33.   Number and Percentage of Army Officers by Prior Enlistment Status 
 
Figure 34 displays promotion rates for Army officers by prior enlistment status. 
About 56.2 percent of non-prior enlisted officers and 54 percent of prior enlisted officers 
were promoted to O-4. There seems to be only a small difference between promotion 





























Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data   
 
Figure 34.   Promotion Rates as of September 30, 2004 by Prior Enlistment Status for 
Army Officers Entering 1981-1995 
 
Figure 35 shows the number of Army officers by their occupational categories. 
The majority (70 percent) of the officers serve in the combat arms specialty, and they 
number 8,461.  Combat service support officers comprise the second largest group and 
number 1,407 (12 percent). The number of officers in the special branches and combat 






















Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 35.   Number and Percentage of Army Officers by Military Occupational 
Category 
 
Figure 36 shows promotion rates by occupational categories. Special branches 
category has the highest promotion rate (60.9 percent). This category is followed by 
combat arms and combat service support with promotion rates of 55.5 percent and 54.2 






















































































Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
 
Figure 36.   Promotion Rates as of September 30, 2004 by Military Occupational 
Category for Army Officers Entering 1981-1995 
 
C. DATA LIMITATIONS 
The main focus of this study is the effect of education level of officers on 
retention and promotion. However, in the data set, the education level of about 90,000 
officers was miscoded or was unknown. The coding system for the education level 
variable was changed three times between 1981 and 2004. Some of the observations were 
lost in changes in the coding system. As a result, observations with miscoded or unknown 
education level have been deleted from the database for this study. While this deletion 
caused the number of observations used for analysis to decrease, it is assumed that the 
deleted observations were missing at random and their omission does not affect the 
validity of the study.  
In order to provide some information on the representativeness of the retention 
and promotion samples, Table 7 compares and contrasts some of the characteristics of 
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Active Duty Officers in the Army in 2004 with those of officers used in this study. The 
actual values for Army officers are obtained from the Army’s official web page.101 
As seen in the table, there are no large differences between actual and sample 
percentages. The small differences that appear in the table may be attributable to time 
differences. The actual values show the percentages of officers who were on active duty 
in 2004, whereas the sample values show the percentages of all officers commissioned 
from 1981 to 2001 for retention analysis, and from 1981 to 1995 for promotion analysis.  
 
Table 7.   Characteristics of Army Officers from the "2004 Army Profile" and from 
the Retention and Promotion Samples in This Thesis 
VARIABLE US Army 2004*,102 Retention Sample Promotion Sample
Education Level       
BA/BS (College) 58.60 percent 59.21 percent 68.49 percent 
MA/PhD 40.00 percent 30.59 percent 30.75 percent 
OTHER 1.400 percent 10.20 percent 0.76 percent 
Marital Status    
Married 66 percent 74.71 percent 82.15 percent 
Race/Ethnicity    
White 75.40 percent 79.06 percent 83.99 percent 
Black  12.30 percent 11.56 percent 10.92 percent 
Hispanic 5.00 percent 3.83 percent 1.78 percent 
Other  7.30 percent 5.55 percent 3.32 percent 
Gender    
Male 83.35 percent 84.34 percent 86.40 percent 
*SOURCE: Army Profile from US Army Official Web Page and Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
Education level is classified into four different categories for the analysis. These 
categories are not problematic in the retention model. However, after deleting invalid 
observations, there were only 20 officers with doctorate degrees in the data set used for 
                                                 
101 The US Army Official Web Page, Army Profile, 
<http://www.army.mil/references/FY04ArmyProfile.pdf#search=percent22militarypercent20officerspercen




promotion analysis, which is too few. For this reason, officers with doctorate degrees are 
combined with the master's degree holders for survival analysis. 
Some variables that were used in previous studies on the effects of education level 
on retention and/or promotion were not available in the data set and could not be used in 
the analysis. These variables include the college grade point average of an officer, 
performance reports, whether an officer separated voluntarily, the quality of the college 
from which the officer graduated, awards received, and the officer’s alma mater for 
graduate education (military or civilian).  
Survival analysis is used as the empirical approach for both retention and 
promotion models. Survival analysis requires using a duration variable as the dependent 
variable. Two different duration variables are used for the two models in this study. For 
the retention model, YEARSSERVED is used and it is calculated by counting active duty 
service years. However, in the data set, some of the observations have gaps in pay grade 
history, and these observations are deleted. For the promotion analysis, the duration 
variable is TIMEYRS, which is calculated by counting valid years until an officer 
becomes a major or until the censoring year. Some of the observations had incorrect 
values for this variable and it was necessary to delete these observations.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The number of observations for retention analysis is 45,228, promotion analysis 
uses 12,092 observations. For the promotion model, only officers who served at least 
eight years are included in the analysis. Thus, officers commissioned after 1996 are 
eliminated for the promotion analysis. Censored values and the total number of 
observations for each model are summarized in Table 8.  Of all the officers who entered 
commissioned service between 1981 and 2001, 26.52 percent had left the Army by 
September 2004. Of all the officers commissioned between 1981 and 1995, 55.76 percent 
had been promoted to O-4 (MAJOR) by the same date. For the retention model, censored 




promotion model, the censored observations are those who were not promoted by 
September 30, 2004, or who left the Army by that date after serving at least eight years 
but not being promoted to O-4.  
 












Retention 45,228 11,996 33,232 73.48 
Promotion 12,092 6,742 5,350 44.24 
Source: Author tabulations based on DMDC data 
Based on the preliminary analysis presented in this chapter, advanced education 
seems to be positively correlated with both the retention and promotion of Army officers. 
Officers with master's degrees and doctorate degrees have the lowest separation rates. In 
addition, officers with baccalaureate degrees have the lowest promotion rates among the 
four education level categories.  
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VI. RESULTS OF SURVIVAL ANALYSIS 
Two different outcomes are analyzed in this study - the retention of Army officers 
and the promotion of Army officers. The chapter therefore addresses the analyses in two 
different subsections. It first discusses the retention analysis. This is followed by a 
discussion of the promotion results. In both models, three SAS procedures are used - 
PROC LIFETEST, PROC LIFEREG and PROC PHREG. The chapter first discusses 
PROC LIFETEST results, since they show whether there are differences among survival 
curves (promotion curves) of officer groups with different education levels. This is 
followed by a display of the PROC LIFEREG results for parametric duration analysis. 
Finally, there is an explanation of the PROC PHREG results for Cox proportional hazard 
models. The hypothesized and observed effects are compared in the last part of the 
chapter. 
A. RETENTION ANALYSIS 
1. Analysis of Survival Patterns  
The PROC LIFETEST procedure in SAS uses both the Kaplan-Meier method and 
the life-table method in order to find estimates of survivor functions. In fact, the two 
methods yield the same results. The Kaplan-Meier method gives results for each 
individual in the data set, whereas the life-table method gives results from grouping the 
observations into time intervals. Both methods give the probability that a person will 
survive until the time t+1, given that he or she has survived until the time t, as well as the 
probability of not surviving (separate or not promote) during the same time frame.103 The 
life-table method produces estimates and plots of the hazard function.104 For this reason, 
this study uses the life-table method. 
Table 9 shows the life-table survival estimates, in which, officers are grouped in 
five-year intervals. The first two columns show the intervals by years. The third and 
                                                 
103 Paul D.Allison, Survival Analysis Using SAS, 29-41. 
104 Ibid., 41. 
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fourth columns show the number who separate and who are censored. The effective 
sample size is the number of officers who survived to that interval, but it is calculated at 
the mid-point. Since the officers are grouped in five-year intervals, it is unknown who left 
in which year. Thus, the value of the effective sample size is calculated at the mid-point. 
This assumes that the distribution of failures is normal in that interval. So, every 
observation that is censored within an interval is treated as if it were censored at the mid-
point of the interval.105 Since censored cases are at risk for half of the interval, they only 
count for half in figuring the effective sample size.106 For example, the effective sample 
size for the first interval is 45,228 – (1,013/2) = 44,721.5. 
 


















Error Survival Failure 
0 5 3351 1013 44721.5 0.0749 0.00124 1 0 
5 10 5372 12647 34540.5 0.1555 0.00195 0.9251 0.0749 
10 15 1780 9291 18199.5 0.0978 0.0022 0.7812 0.2188 
15 20 575 8052 7748 0.0742 0.00298 0.7048 0.2952 
20 25 918 2229 2032.5 0.4517 0.011 0.6525 0.3475 
 














0 5 0 0.015 0.000249 0.015569 0.000269 
5 10 0.00124 0.0288 0.000363 0.033728 0.000459 
10 15 0.00209 0.0153 0.000346 0.020567 0.000487 
15 20 0.00255 0.0105 0.000421 0.015415 0.000642 
20 25 0.00316 0.0589 0.00147 0.116683 0.003684 
 Source: Author 
The conditional probability of failure in column six shows the probability that an 
officer is going to leave in an interval, given that he or she made it to the beginning of 
that interval. For example, the probability of an officer leaving the Army between the 
                                                 
105 Allison, 44. 
106 Ibid. 
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sixth and tenth years (second interval) is 0.1555, given that he or she is still in the service 
at the beginning of the sixth year. This is calculated as (number failed / effective sample 
size).107 The survival column (column 8) shows that the event occurs at a time later than 
or equal to the start time of each interval.108 For example, the probability that an officer 
will not leave the Army until year 5 is 0.9251. In other words, the probability that an 
officer continues to serve (survives) until year 5 is 0.9251. The failure column (column 9) 
is calculated by subtracting the survival column from one. This column shows the 
opposite of the survival column, that is, it shows the probability of an event occurring by 
the beginning of that interval. For example, the probability that an officer will leave by 
the beginning of the second interval (year 5) is 0.0749.  
PDF shows the estimate of the Probability Density Function at the mid-point of 
that interval. The Hazard column shows the estimate of the hazard function at the 
midpoint.  For each statistic presented in the Life-Table estimates, the standard errors are 
also shown next to each estimate.109  
The PROC LIFETEST procedure in SAS also gives the censored and uncensored 
values. As seen in Table 10, 11,996 officers out of 45,228 left the Army by the end of the 
observation period (September 30, 2004). 
 
Table 10.   Censored (Stay) and Uncensored (Leave) Values 
Summary of the Number of Censored and 
Uncensored Values 
Total Failed Censored Percent Censored 
45,228 11,996 33,232 73.48 




                                                 
107 Allison, 44. 
108 Ibid., 45. 
109 Ibid., 46. 
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The survivor functions can be plotted in a graph by using the LIFETEST 
procedure in SAS. Figure 37 shows a plot of the survival function for Army officers. As 
seen in the figure, the survival function is flat until the fourth year, indicating that almost 
everybody continues serving in the Army up to that year, which is the end of the initial 
service obligation for most officers. After that year the function becomes steeper. The 
function is then almost flat until the twelfth to thirteenth year. After that it becomes 
slightly steeper. These years mark both the promotion point to major for most officers, 
and end of service obligation related to graduate education. Then the function continues, 
becoming flatter until the twentieth year, where it has a sharp decrease. The twentieth 
year is the retirement eligibility point for officers. Thus, the function falls steeply 
showing the separation (retirement) behavior of officers. 
 
Source: Author 
Figure 37.   Survival Distribution Function of Army Officers (Retention Model) 
 
End of Initial 
Service Obligation 
Promotion to O-4 or End of Graduate 
Education Service Obligation 
Retirement 
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Figure 38 displays the plot of the hazard function for Army officers. As seen in 
the figure, the hazard of leaving the service increases in the fourth year and remains the 
same until the sixth year. Again, this time period is the end of the initial service 
obligation. There is an increase in the hazard function in the twelfth to thirteenth years, 
which is both the promotion point for officers and the end of service obligation related to 
graduate education. Finally, there is a sharp increase in the hazard function in the 
twentieth year, which is retirement point. 
 
Source: Author 
Figure 38.   Hazard Function of Army Officers (Retention Model) 
 
The main focus of this study is the effect of education level on the retention and 
promotion of Army officers. Thus, one of the research questions is to find out if there are 
any differences among the survival or hazard functions of officers with different  
 
End of Initial Service 
Obligation 
Retirement 
Promotion to O-4 or End of Graduate 
Education Service Obligation 
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education levels. Table 11 shows the number of failed (separated) and censored (still in 
service in 2004) officers, and the percent of censored values for officers with four 
different education levels. 
 
Table 11.   Summary of the Number of Censored (Stay) and Failed (Leave) 
Observations (Retention) 
EDUCATION LEVEL Total Failed  Censored Percent Censored 
Log-
Rank Wilcoxon 
COLLEGE 26781 8588 18193 67.93 2982 102120000 
MASTER’S DEGREE 13403 1826 11577 86.38 279 7438692 
DOCTORATE DEGREE 432 98 334 77.31 -79 -1889177 
PROFESSIONAL DEGREE 4612 1484 3128 67.82 -3182 -107700000 
Source: Author 
 
Table 12 displays the results of testing the null hypothesis that the survival 
functions of officers with different education levels are the same. The PROC LIFETEST 
procedure gives three statistics for testing this null hypothesis -- the log-rank test 
(Mantel-Haenszel test), the Wilcoxon test, and the likelihood-ratio test.  The Wilcoxon 
test gives more importance to earlier time periods. Thus, it is less sensitive to differences 
in later time periods than the log-rank test.  The Wilcoxon test is more powerful in 
situations where event times have log-normal distributions. The third method is the 
likelihood-ratio test, which assumes an exponential distribution.110 As seen in Table 12, 
one can reject the null hypothesis at all usual levels using all of these tests, and conclude 
that survival functions of officers differ with their education levels. 
 
Table 12.   Test Statistics for the Equality in Survival Behavior of Officers with 
Different Education Levels 
Test of Equality over Strata 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > Chi Square 
Log-Rank 4249.1439 3 <.0001 
Wilcoxon 4002.3154 3 <.0001 
-2Log(LR) 3975.8201 3 <.0001 
            Source: Author 
                                                 
110 Allison, 36-39. 
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Figure 39 displays the survival functions of officers with different educational 
levels. During the first four years there is no difference between the survival functions of 
officers, due to the service obligation for all officers. As seen in the figure, college 
graduates have the lowest survival curve. Officers with master’s degrees have the highest 
survival functions, with the exception of the last 2-3 years.  
 
 
 Source: Author 
Figure 39.   Survival Distribution Function of Army officers with Different Education 
Levels 
 
College graduates and professional degree holders have approximately similar 
survival functions, whereas officers with master’s and doctorate degrees have very 
similar survival curves; however, there is a great difference between the survival 
functions of officers with baccalaureate or professional degrees and officers with 
master’s or doctorate degrees. In all groups, there is a sharp decrease in survival functions 









The PROC LIFETEST procedure in SAS also produces the log-survival plot. 
Examining this plot is useful because it gives information about the trend in the survival 
function. That is, it shows whether the hazard is constant, increasing or decreasing over 
time. Figure 40 displays the log-survival plot for officers with different education levels. 
The graphs for all groups increase at an increasing rate after the twentieth year of service, 
showing that the hazard of separating from the Army for officers increases with time. 
Nevertheless, until the twentieth year, the hazard functions are almost constant, showing 
that the hazard of leaving increases at a constant rate until that year. However, the 
sharpest increase is observed for officers with baccalaureate degrees. The second sharpest 
increase is observed for officers with professional degrees. The hazard plots of officers 
with master’s and doctorate degrees are almost flat, showing that their separation rates 
increase at a small constant rate over time until the twentieth year.  
 
 
 Source: Author 











2. Results of Parametric Regression Models 
The LIFEREG procedure calculates parametric regression estimates using the 
maximum likelihood method. There are five different distributions used in PROC 
LIFEREG for survival analysis -- lognormal, Weibull, exponential, gamma and log-
logistic. These five distributions have different implications for hazard functions, which 
may lead to important differences in interpretation.111 
Table 13 displays the results of the LIFEREG procedure for all five distributions. 
As seen in Table 13, the significance of coefficients changes from model to model. For 
example, although the coefficient of ROTCSCHOLAR is significant at all usual levels 
using the WEIBULL and EXPONENTIAL distributions, it is not significant at any usual 
level in any of the other distributions. The signs of the coefficients show the direction of 
the relationship. In other words, the signs show the effects of explanatory variables on the 
retention of officers. Parameter estimates are not interpreted directly -- a conversion is 
required, which is explained later in this chapter. The parameter estimates also change 
from distribution to distribution, indicating that the magnitude of the effects of 
independent variables change from distribution to distribution.  
Of these five distributions, one fits the data set best. The goodness of fit can be 
evaluated and compared in two different ways -- using log-likelihoods and with a 
graphical method. Likelihood ratio statistics can be used to compare nested models. A 
model is nested within another model if that model can be obtained by imposing 
restrictions on the parameters in the second model. The exponential model is nested 
within the Weibull and gamma models. Furthermore, the Weibull and log-normal models 
are nested within the gamma model. Taking the differences between nested models and 
multiplying by two gives the likelihood-ratio chi-square statistics. Lower magnitudes 
correspond to better fits.112 
 
 
                                                 
111 Allison, 66. 
112 Allison, 88-91. 
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Table 13.    Results of PROC LIFEREG Procedure 
 LNORMAL  WEIBULL  EXPONENT  GAMMA  LLOGISTIC  
Variable Estimate  ChiSq Estimate ChiSq Estimate  ChiSq Estimate ChiSq Estimate  ChiSq 
Intercept 3.17591 <.0001 3.15969 <.0001 3.32963 <.0001 3.15195 <.0001 3.09786 <.0001 
GRADUATEDEGREE 0.29837 <.0001 0.3038 <.0001 0.87643 <.0001 0.25563 <.0001 0.30986 <.0001 
DOCTORATEDEGREE 0.2421 <.0001 0.2512 <.0001 0.72398 <.0001 0.21464 <.0001 0.25516 <.0001 
PROFESSIONALDEGREE 0.08445 <.0001 0.08796 <.0001 0.24055 <.0001 0.07891 <.0001 0.08835 <.0001 
FEMALE -0.0924 <.0001 -0.0993 <.0001 -0.2654 <.0001 -0.0572 <.0001 -0.1029 <.0001 
MARRIED 0.14507 <.0001 0.13033 <.0001 0.35282 <.0001 0.13753 <.0001 0.14681 <.0001 
ENTRYAGE -0.0104 <.0001 -0.0088 <.0001 -0.026 <.0001 -0.0113 <.0001 -0.0099 <.0001 
BLACK 0.08159 <.0001 0.08909 <.0001 0.23851 <.0001 0.04403 <.0001 0.0923 <.0001 
HISPANIC 0.06182 0.0001 0.05736 0.0004 0.1581 0.0019 0.0403 0.0096 0.06569 <.0001 
OTHERRACE 0.04522 0.0006 0.04632 0.0002 0.12455 0.0017 0.03894 0.0027 0.04838 0.0003 
ROTCSCHOLAR 0.00722 0.4324 0.0274 0.0011 0.08621 0.0011 -0.0066 0.4825 0.01359 0.128 
ROTCNONSCHOLAR 0.11418 <.0001 0.13958 <.0001 0.38208 <.0001 0.0675 <.0001 0.13362 <.0001 
OTHERSOURCE 0.07672 <.0001 0.10587 <.0001 0.28672 <.0001 0.03429 0.0039 0.09782 <.0001 
PREENLIST 0.0616 <.0001 0.06947 <.0001 0.18508 <.0001 0.05258 <.0001 0.06988 <.0001 
COMBATSUPPORT -0.0431 0.0003 -0.0479 <.0001 -0.1424 <.0001 -0.0213 0.07 -0.0461 <.0001 
COMBATSERVICESUPPORT -0.0365 0.0002 -0.0331 0.0005 -0.088 0.0034 -0.0275 0.0042 -0.0369 0.0002 
SPECIALBRANCHES -0.0743 <.0001 -0.0778 <.0001 -0.2176 <.0001 -0.0579 <.0001 -0.0812 <.0001 
ENTRYYR82 0.05522 0.0893 0.04389 0.097 0.18781 0.0241 0.04819 0.1711 0.05022 0.084 
ENTRYYR83 0.06672 0.0526 0.05378 0.0615 0.28903 0.0014 0.05198 0.1558 0.05869 0.0596 
ENTRYYR84 0.13837 <.0001 0.12763 <.0001 0.58947 <.0001 0.10409 0.0007 0.12833 <.0001 
ENTRYYR85 0.3691 <.0001 0.42106 <.0001 1.59731 <.0001 0.24448 <.0001 0.39227 <.0001 
ENTRYYR86 0.32595 <.0001 0.38702 <.0001 1.62074 <.0001 0.19962 <.0001 0.35092 <.0001 
ENTRYYR87 0.25323 <.0001 0.29926 <.0001 1.46313 <.0001 0.13871 <.0001 0.26945 <.0001 
ENTRYYR88 0.1628 <.0001 0.19477 <.0001 1.25232 <.0001 0.05289 0.0594 0.17316 <.0001 
ENTRYYR89 0.01344 0.6136 0.0374 0.1248 0.91118 <.0001 -0.0877 0.0013 0.02013 0.4254 
ENTRYYR90 -0.0826 0.0017 -0.0611 0.0096 0.74174 <.0001 -0.1753 <.0001 -0.0787 0.0015 
ENTRYYR91 -0.1423 <.0001 -0.1249 <.0001 0.68509 <.0001 -0.2371 <.0001 -0.1395 <.0001 
ENTRYYR92 -0.2089 <.0001 -0.1897 <.0001 0.63989 <.0001 -0.3107 <.0001 -0.2032 <.0001 
ENTRYYR93 -0.3088 <.0001 -0.283 <.0001 0.52854 <.0001 -0.4212 <.0001 -0.2993 <.0001 
ENTRYYR94 -0.41 <.0001 -0.3748 <.0001 0.42634 <.0001 -0.5351 <.0001 -0.3939 <.0001 
ENTRYYR95 -0.5655 <.0001 -0.5234 <.0001 0.18943 0.0034 -0.6963 <.0001 -0.5473 <.0001 
ENTRYYR96 -0.7594 <.0001 -0.6944 <.0001 -0.0888 0.1515 -0.9062 <.0001 -0.7339 <.0001 
ENTRYYR97 -0.9465 <.0001 -0.8566 <.0001 -0.3114 <.0001 -1.115 <.0001 -0.9126 <.0001 
ENTRYYR98 -1.0723 <.0001 -0.9737 <.0001 -0.4124 <.0001 -1.2764 <.0001 -1.0243 <.0001 
ENTRYYR99 -1.098 <.0001 -1.0164 <.0001 -0.2861 <.0001 -1.3473 <.0001 -1.0429 <.0001 
ENTRYYR00 -1.1977 <.0001 -1.1222 <.0001 -0.2463 0.0012 -1.5236 <.0001 -1.145 <.0001 
ENTRYYR01 -1.2084 <.0001 -1.1066 <.0001 0.24746 0.0234 -1.5355 <.0001 -1.1372 <.0001 
Source: Author 
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In the graphical approach, a graph of the survivor function is drawn and then that 
graph is compared with one drawn as a straight line originating at zero. This line is the 
survival function plotted against time with zero residuals, meaning that all observations 
are on that line and there are no deviations.  Thus, the distribution that deviates least from 
the straight line is the best. 
The log likelihoods for five different models are shown in Table 14. If chi-square 
statistics are calculated by using these log likelihoods as explained above, then the results 
in Table 15 are obtained. The exponential and Weibull models are rejected, and the Log-
logistic model is rejected as well. As a result, it can be concluded that both the log-
normal and gamma models fit the data very well. 
 
Table 14.   Log Likelihoods of All Distributions (Retention Model) 








Table 15.   Chi-Square Statistics within Nested Models 
Comparison Chi-Square 
Exponential vs. Weibull 12238.60732 
Exponential vs. Gamma 14761.90036 
Weibull vs. Gamma 2523.29304 
Log-Normal vs. Gamma 758.55066 
Log-Logistic vs. Gamma 1682.18676 
Source: Author 
One can check this result with the second method, which is the graphical 
approach. Figures 41 through 45 plot the residuals for all distributions. As seen in the 
figures, the gamma model fits best, as it has the least deviation from the straight line.  
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Since the gamma distribution is judged the best using the graphical method and is one of 
the two best methods using the log-likelihood method, this distribution will be used for 
the retention analysis of Army officers. 
 
 
 Source: Author 





 Source: Author 




 Source: Author 






 Source: Author 




 Source: Author 
 
Figure 45.   Residual Plot - Retention Model (Log – logistic Distribution) 
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Table 13 displays the LIFEREG procedure results for all distributions. Table 16 
displays the LIFEREG procedure results for the gamma distribution, including estimated 
effects. The Effect column in Table 16 is produced by using the Estimate column in the 
same table. For binary variables, eβ produces the estimated mean difference in survival 
times for two groups.113 For example the coefficient of GRADUATEDEGREE is 
0.25563. Thus, e0.22563=1.2913. This means that officers with master’s degrees are 
estimated to survive 29.13 percent longer than college graduate officers, controlling for 
the other factors. For continuous variables, 100*(eβ-1) gives the percent increase 
(decrease) in the estimated survival time for each one unit increase in the variable.114 As 
a result, the Effect column in Table 16 shows the effect of variables in percentage points.  
The results show that all levels of advanced education have positive effects on the 
retention of Army officers. The effects are significant at all usual levels, as seen in the 
tables (p-values). The expected survival time of an officer with a master’s degree is 29.13 
percent greater than that of an officer who has baccalaureate degree, accounting for other 
covariates. The expected survival time of an officer with doctorate degree is 23.94 
percent greater, and the expected survival time of an officer with a professional degree is 
8.21 percent more than that of an officer who has baccalaureate degree, accounting for 
other covariates.  
For the demographic variables, being married and being in a minority group have 
a positive effect on service times, whereas being female and each additional year in entry 
age have a negative effect. All these effects are statistically significant at all usual levels. 
Service time of married officers is estimated to be 14.74 percent longer than for single 
officers, ceteris paribus. The expected survival time of black officers is 4.50 percent 
greater, of Hispanic officers is 4.11 percent greater and of officers of other minority 
groups is 3.97 percent greater, respectively, than that of white officers. Service time of 
female officers is expected to be 5.56 percent less than for male officers, when 
                                                 
113 Allison, 65.  
114 Ibid. 
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controlling for other factors. Each additional year increase in entry age decreases the 
expected survival time of officers by 1.12 percent, controlling for other covariates 
Commissioning source variables have statistically significant effects on the 
retention behavior of officers with the exception of ROTCSCHOLAR. Thus, compared 
with USMA graduates, the survival time of officers whose commissioning source is 
ROTC non-scholarship is expected to be 6.98 percent greater, and the survival time of 
officers who are commissioned through other sources is expected to be 3.49 percent 
longer than that of USMA graduates, ceteris paribus. Having an ROTC scholarship as a 
commissioning source has no significant effect on the survival times of officers. Having 
served as enlisted before being commissioned as an officer increases service time by 5.40 
percent, and this result is significant at all usual levels.  
 
Table 16.   Results of Gamma Distribution (Retention Model) 
Variable Estimate Effect (%) Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept 3.15195  7555.2641 <.0001
GRADUATEDEGREE 0.25563 29.13 904.5559 <.0001
DOCTORATEDEGREE 0.21464 23.94 44.52 <.0001
PROFESSIONALDEGREE 0.07891 8.21 34.3136 <.0001
FEMALE -0.05717 -5.56 43.3365 <.0001
MARRIED 0.13753 14.74 372.7108 <.0001
ENTRYAGE -0.01126 -1.12 86.1651 <.0001
BLACK 0.04403 4.50 20.8966 <.0001
HISPANIC 0.0403 4.11 6.7149 0.0096
OTHERRACE 0.03894 3.97 9.0089 0.0027
ROTCSCHOLAR -0.0066027 -- 0.4931 0.4825
ROTCNONSCHOLAR 0.0675 6.98 47.9589 <.0001
OTHERSOURCE 0.03429 3.49 8.3131 0.0039
PREENLIST 0.05258 5.40 55.0446 <.0001
COMBATSUPPORT -0.02128 -2.11 3.2836 0.07
COMBATSERVICESUPPORT -0.02754 -2.72 8.1974 0.0042
SPECIALBRANCHES -0.05786 -5.62 29.3916 <.0001
Source: Author 
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All occupational categories in the model have a significantly negative effect on 
retention, compared with combat arms. The expected service time of officers serving in 
combat support fields is 2.11 percent lower than that of officers serving in combat arms 
fields, controlling for other factors. The service time of officers serving in combat service 
support fields is 2.72 percent lower, and the service time of officers serving in special 
branch fields is 5.62 percent lower than that of officers serving in combat arms fields. 
The result for the combat support category is significant at 0.10 level and results for the 
other occupational categories are significant at all usual levels. 
Officers commissioned from 1984 to 1988 are found to have longer survival 
times, whereas officers commissioned after 1988 are found to have shorter survival times, 
when compared to officers commissioned in 1981. This shows the survival trend in the 
Army, which is generally decreasing on average. Commissioning years 1982 and 1983 
have no significant effect on the retention of officers (see Table 13). 
3. Results of Estimating Cox Regression Models 
The same variables used for the LIFEREG procedure are used in the PHREG 
procedure. Unlike PROC LIFEREG, the Cox proportional hazard model does not 
necessitate choosing any particular probability distribution to represent survival times. 
Thus, the model specified in PHREG is used directly for the analysis. Another advantage 
of using this regression method is that it allows the use of time-dependent independent 
variables, which may change their values during the observation period.115 
To test the global null hypothesis, which is that all the coefficients are equal to 
zero (the explanatory variables have no effect on the survival times), the PHREG 
procedure calculates three statistics -- likelihood ratio, score test and Wald test. The 
results of these tests are given in Table 17. All of the test results have a p-value of less 
than 0.0001, showing that at least one of the coefficients is not equal to zero, and at least 
one of the explanatory variables has an effect on the hazard function. 
 
 
                                                 
115 Allison, 111,112. 
 114
Table 17.   Global Test Statistics for the Retention Model for the Null Hypothesis that 
All Coefficients are Equal to Zero 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 14335.2664 36 <.0001 
Score 12379.6962 36 <.0001 
Wald 8446.804 36 <.0001 
                  Source: Author 
 
Table 18 displays the results of the PHREG procedure. There is no intercept 
estimate in the results, which is a characteristic of partial likelihood estimates.116 The 
signs of the parameter estimates show the opposite of the effect on the survival function. 
The reason is that PROC PHREG results are in log-hazard format. The hazard ratio, in 
the last column, is eβ.  
The effect of the advanced education variables on the probability of continuation 
or separation of officers is found to be positive, as in the LIFEREG procedure. That is, 
the probability of separation of officers with advanced degrees is less than for college 
graduates. Coefficients of all of the education variables are significant at all usual levels. 
Since all the hazard ratios associated with education variables are less than one, they 
indicate that the hazard of leaving the service for officers with advanced education 
degrees is less than the base case, which is a baccalaureate degree. An officer with a 
master’s degree has a hazard of leaving that is 38.3 percent of that of an officer with just 
a college degree (base case) (61.7 % less), controlling for the other variables.  The hazard 
of separation for an officer with a doctorate degree is 55.6 percent less than that of an 
officer with a college degree, ceteris paribus. An officer with a professional degree has a 
hazard of leaving the service that is 75.6 percent of that of a college graduate, when 
controlling for other factors. 
 
 
                                                 
116 Allison, 117. 
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Table 18.   Results of the PHREG Procedure for the Retention Model 
 Variable Estimate
Standard 
Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Hazard 
Ratio
GRADUATEDEGREE -0.9594 0.02996 1025.465 <.0001 0.383
DOCTORATEDEGREE -0.81274 0.10492 60.0008 <.0001 0.444
PROFESSIONALDEGREE -0.28007 0.03937 50.598 <.0001 0.756
FEMALE 0.30271 0.02481 148.8544 <.0001 1.354
MARRIED -0.39991 0.01997 401.1292 <.0001 0.67
ENTRYAGE 0.02884 0.00374 59.3616 <.0001 1.029
BLACK -0.27624 0.03235 72.8932 <.0001 0.759
HISPANIC -0.17765 0.05085 12.2031 0.0005 0.837
OTHERRACE -0.14605 0.03969 13.5399 0.0002 0.864
ROTCSCHOLAR -0.07193 0.02642 7.4109 0.0065 0.931
ROTCNONSCHOLAR -0.41193 0.02996 189.0655 <.0001 0.662
OTHERSOURCE -0.30279 0.03674 67.9276 <.0001 0.739
PREENLIST -0.20984 0.02269 85.5416 <.0001 0.811
COMBATSUPPORT 0.14336 0.03518 16.6093 <.0001 1.154
COMBATSERVICESUPPORT 0.10048 0.03008 11.1578 0.0008 1.106
SPECIALBRANCHES 0.24152 0.03148 58.8469 <.0001 1.273
ENTRYYR82 -0.22423 0.08326 7.2536 0.0071 0.799
ENTRYYR83 -0.2409 0.09123 6.9726 0.0083 0.786
ENTRYYR84 -0.42693 0.0821 27.0401 <.0001 0.653
ENTRYYR85 -1.3102 0.13424 95.2629 <.0001 0.27
ENTRYYR86 0.02865 0.12639 0.0514 0.8207 1.029
ENTRYYR87 0.53281 0.12413 18.4243 <.0001 1.704
ENTRYYR88 0.91714 0.11623 62.2592 <.0001 2.502
ENTRYYR89 1.4927 0.11238 176.4146 <.0001 4.449
ENTRYYR90 1.81817 0.11234 261.9159 <.0001 6.161
ENTRYYR91 1.99679 0.11353 309.3413 <.0001 7.365
ENTRYYR92 2.17208 0.11315 368.4945 <.0001 8.777
ENTRYYR93 2.46896 0.11265 480.3557 <.0001 11.81
ENTRYYR94 2.84441 0.11201 644.8604 <.0001 17.191
ENTRYYR95 3.25545 0.1115 852.4257 <.0001 25.931
ENTRYYR96 3.69052 0.11048 1115.76 <.0001 40.066
ENTRYYR97 4.07706 0.10965 1382.535 <.0001 58.972
ENTRYYR98 4.27887 0.10988 1516.376 <.0001 72.159




Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Hazard 
Ratio
ENTRYYR00 4.2522 0.11986 1258.611 <.0001 70.26
ENTRYYR01 4.03903 0.14376 789.3915 <.0001 56.771
Source: Author 
All of the demographic characteristics also have significant effects on the 
retention behavior of Army officers at all usual levels. The hazard of separation for a 
female officer is 135.4 percent of that of a male officer, ceteris paribus. A married Army 
officer has a hazard of leaving the service that is 67 percent of that of a single Army 
officer, when controlling for other factors. Each one-year increase in the entry age 
increases the hazard of separation by 2.9 percent (100 * (1.029 – 1) = 2.9%). 
All of the minority group officers have lower hazards of leaving when compared 
to white officers, and the coefficients are significant at all usual levels. Controlling for 
other variables, a black officer has a hazard of separation that is 75.9 percent of a white 
officer’s; a Hispanic officer has a hazard of leaving that is 83.7 percent of a white 
officer's; and officers of other races have a hazard of leaving the Army that is 86.4 
percent of that of a white officer. 
All of the commissioning source variables are also significant at all usual levels. 
Furthermore, the hazard ratios of officers whose commissioning source is other than the 
Academy are lower than that of an Academy graduate. The hazard of separation for an 
officer whose commissioning source is ROTC scholarship is 93.1 percent of that of a 
USMA graduate, ceteris paribus. An ROTC non-scholarship graduate has a hazard of 
leaving that is 66.2 percent of that of an Academy graduate. Those with other sources of 
commission have a hazard of separation that is 73.9 percent of that of a USMA graduate. 
Officers who served as enlisted before being commissioned as an officer have a lower 
hazard of leaving the service than those who did not. 
All of the officers serving in categories other than combat arms have higher 
hazards of separation and results are significant at all usual levels. An officer serving in 
combat support fields has a hazard of leaving that is 115.4 percent (15.4 percent higher) 
of that of officers serving in combat arm fields. Officers serving in combat service 
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support fields have a hazard of leaving that is 110.6 percent (10.6 percent higher), and 
officers serving in special branches have a hazard of leaving that is 127.3 percent (27.3 
percent higher) of that of officers serving in combat arm fields.  
The coefficients of the commissioning year variables are all significant with the 
exception of the FY 1986 variable. In general, the hazard of separation increases as 
commissioning year increases, again as in the results of the LIFEREG procedure, 
showing the general increasing separation trend among Army officers from year to year 
over the period. 
The result of the ROTC scholar variable was not significant in the LIFEREG 
procedure, but it is significant in the PHREG procedure. All other results of the PHREG 
procedure are similar to the results of the LIFEREG procedure. 
B. PROMOTION ANALYSIS 
1. Analysis of Survival Patterns  
Table 19 displays the life-table survival estimates for the promotion model. As 
seen in the table, during the first eight years, failed and censored columns are equal to 
zero. The reason is that officers were observed only after they had served eight years. The 
third column, which is called number failed, shows the number of officers who were 
promoted to major in that interval. For example, 5,837 officers were promoted to major 
between years 12 and 14. This group is the majority of the officers who were promoted to 
O-4. The number censored column, which is the fourth column, shows the number of 
officers who made it to that interval but were not promoted to O-4, and thus were 
censored. As explained earlier, censored officers either left the Army in that interval or 
continued to serve for the next interval. Effective sample size is calculated at the mid-
point, as explained in the retention section of this chapter. Since there was no one 
promoted or censored until the eighth year, all officers used for the analysis were on 
active duty during that time with a rank lower than major.  
The conditional probability of failure shows the probability that an officer is 
going to be promoted in that interval, given that he or she made it to the beginning of that 
interval. For example, the probability of an officer being promoted to O-4 between the 
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twelfth and thirteenth years is 0.9364, given that he or she is in the service at the 
beginning of that interval. The survival column shows that the event occurs later than or 
at the start time for each interval.117 For example, the probability that an officer will not 
be promoted until the beginning of the tenth year is 0.9983. The failure column is 
calculated by subtracting the survival column from one. This column shows the opposite 
of the survival column; that is, it shows the probability of an event occurring by the 
beginning of that interval. For example, the probability that an officer is promoted to 
major by the beginning of the tenth year is 0.00168. The PDF and Hazard columns show 
the functions, as explained in the retention section of this chapter. 
 


















Error Survival Failure 
0 2 0 0 12092 0 0 1 0 
2 4 0 0 12092 0 0 1 0 
4 6 0 0 12092 0 0 1 0 
6 8 0 0 12092 0 0 1 0 
8 10 18 2784 10700 0.00168 0.000396 1 0 
10 12 854 1858 8361 0.1021 0.00331 0.9983 0.00168 
12 14 5837 689 6233.5 0.9364 0.00309 0.8963 0.1037 
14 16 31 16 44 0.7045 0.0688 0.057 0.943 
16 18 2 3 3.5 0.5714 0.2645 0.0168 0.9832 
Source: Author  














0 2 0 0 . 0 . 
2 4 0 0 . 0 . 
4 6 0 0 . 0 . 
6 8 0 0 . 0 . 
8 10 0 0.000841 0.000198 0.000842 0.000198 
10 12 0.000396 0.051 0.00165 0.053819 0.001839 
12 14 0.00333 0.4197 0.00208 0.880392 0.005465 
14 16 0.00278 0.0201 0.00219 0.54386 0.081971 
16 18 0.00401 0.00481 0.0025 0.4 0.25923 
 Source: Author  
                                                 
117 Allison, 45. 
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Table 20 shows the number of officers promoted and censored during the 
observation period, as calculated by the LIFETEST procedure in SAS software. As seen 
in the table, of 12,092 officers, 6,742 were promoted to O-4 by September 30, 2004. 
 
Table 20.   Censored (Not promoted) and Failed (Promoted) Values 
Summary of the Number of Censored and 
Uncensored Values 
Total Failed Censored Percent Censored 
12092 6742 5350 44.24 
  Source: Author 
Figure 46 shows a plot of the survival (promotion) distribution function. As seen 
in the figure, the survival function is flat until the tenth year, indicating that almost no 
one is promoted during that time. Then, it begins going down slowly until the twelfth 
year, showing that a small number of officers are promoted during that time. Then it goes 
down sharply until the fourteenth year, illustrating that most of the officers are promoted 
during that time frame. It then slowly moves toward zero until the seventeenth year, 
which is the last year that officers are promoted to O-4. After that year, the value of the 




Figure 46.   Survival Distribution Function of Army Officers (Promotion Model) 
 
Figure 47 shows the hazard (of promotion) function of officers. As seen in the 
figure, the hazard of being promoted to O-4 begins to increase slightly at about the tenth 
year. There is a sharp increase in the hazard of promotion after the twelfth year. Then it 
moves downward, beginning at the thirteenth year. There is small increase in the 
sixteenth year, indicating that the hazard of promotion increases a little bit up during that 
year. After that, it continues to decline, and at year 17 it becomes zero, again showing 






Figure 47.   Hazard Function of Army Officers (Promotion Model) 
 
Table 21 shows the number of officers promoted to O-4 and the number of those 
censored, according to their education level, which is main focus of this study. Since 
there are only 20 doctorate degree holders in the sample, those officers are combined 
with the master’s degree category. The failed column shows the number of officers 
promoted to O-4 by education level. Thus, 3,722 of the college graduates, 2,939 of the 
master’s degree holders and 81 of the professional degree holders are promoted to major 






Table 21.   Summary of the Number of Censored (Not Promoted) and Failed (Promoted) 
Values (Promotion Model) 





COLLEGE 8282 3722 4560 55.06 -78.088 -525431
MASTER’S DEGREE 3718 2939 779 20.95 58.523 317079
PROFESSIONAL 
DEGREE 92 81 11 11.96 19.565 208352
Source: Author 
Table 22 displays the results of testing the null hypothesis that the survival 
functions (promotion) of officers with different education levels are the same. As seen in 
Table 22, we can reject the null hypothesis at all usual levels and conclude that survival 
functions of officers differ with their education levels. Thus, their promotion functions 
are different. 
  
Table 22.   Test Statistics for the Equality in Promotion Patterns of Officers with 
Different Education Levels 
Test of Equality over Strata 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > Chi Square 
Log-Rank 26.5995 2 <.0001 
Wilcoxon 48.2064 2 <.0001 
-2Log(LR) 372.457 2 <.0001 
  Source: Author 
 
Figure 48 displays the survival (promotion) functions of officers with different 
educational levels. During the first eight years there is no difference between the survival 
functions of officers. This is due to the fact that this study examines only the promotion 
patterns of officers who served at least eight years. As seen in the figure, professional 
degree holders have the lowest survival curve, showing that those officers are promoted 
within shorter periods than the officers of other categories. Master’s degree holders and 
college graduates seem to have similar survival functions, indicating that their promotion 
time to O-4 is almost equal. However, the bottom (right) of the figure illustrates that 






Figure 48.   Survival Distribution Function of Army officers with Different Education 
Levels (Promotion Model) 
 
Figure 49 displays the log-survival plot for officers with different education 
levels. The graphs for all groups increase at an increasing rate, especially after the twelfth 
year of service, showing that the hazard of promotion increases at an increasing rate until 
the fourteenth year. Then it increases with a decreasing rate. This figure illustrates more 
clearly that the promotion patterns of college graduates and master’s degree holders are 












Figure 49.   Log-Survival Plot for Army Officers with Different Education Levels 
(Promotion Model) 
 
2. Results of Estimating Parametric Regression Models 
Table 23 displays the results of the LIFEREG procedure for all five different 
distributions for the promotion model. As was the case in the retention model, the 
magnitudes and significance levels of explanatory variables in the promotion model also 
differ from distribution to distribution. The parameter estimates cannot be interpreted 
directly and conversion is required. As in the retention model, the signs of the 
coefficients show the direction of the effect. If the sign is negative, then this variable 
decreases the time to be promoted to O-4. If it is positive, then it increases the time to 









Table 23.   Results of PROC LIFEREG Procedure (Promotion Model) 
 LNORMAL  WEIBULL  EXPONENT  GAMMA  LLOGISTIC  
Variable Estimate  ChiSq Estimate ChiSq Estimate  ChiSq Estimate ChiSq Estimate  ChiSq 
Intercept 2.60198 <.0001 2.63256 <.0001 3.25129 <.0001 2.6002 <.0001 2.58529 <.0001 
GRADUATEDEGREE -0.002 0.0393 -0.0056 <.0001 -0.3723 <.0001 -0.0021 0.0272 -0.0011 0.1305 
PROFESSIONALDEGREE -0.0299 <.0001 0.00246 0.6235 -0.4883 <.0001 -0.0247 <.0001 -0.0112 0.0178 
FEMALE -0.0049 0.0021 -0.0164 <.0001 -0.0038 0.9255 -0.0052 0.0009 -0.0032 0.0159 
MARRIED -0.0009 0.4936 -0.0154 <.0001 -0.2216 <.0001 -0.0014 0.2986 -0.0009 0.4221 
ENTRYAGE -0.0015 <.0001 -0.0015 <.0001 0.00227 0.7044 -0.0014 <.0001 -0.0009 <.0001 
BLACK 0.00475 0.002 0.00877 <.0001 0.09477 0.0224 0.00494 0.0013 0.0033 0.007 
HISPANIC 0.001 0.783 0.00224 0.6064 0.15589 0.1156 0.00136 0.7076 0.00164 0.5722 
OTHERRACE -0.0064 0.0151 -0.0058 0.0603 0.02028 0.7723 -0.0058 0.0283 -0.0016 0.4577 
ROTCSCHOLAR 0.00076 0.6365 -0.0075 <.0001 -0.001 0.9815 0.00074 0.6444 0.00119 0.313 
ROTCNONSCHOLAR 0.00035 0.7896 -0.0013 0.428 -0.0167 0.6283 0.00054 0.6833 0.00118 0.2376 
OTHERSOURCE -0.0104 <.0001 -0.0005 0.8193 -0.052 0.2875 -0.0101 <.0001 -0.0075 <.0001 
PREENLIST -0.0068 <.0001 -0.0008 0.6168 -0.0205 0.5402 -0.0065 <.0001 -0.0045 <.0001 
COMBATSUPPORT 0.00381 0.0255 0.00638 0.0013 0.04483 0.3173 0.00368 0.0301 0.00172 0.1693 
COMBATSERVICESUPPORT -0.0044 0.0039 0.00806 <.0001 0.05974 0.1424 -0.0041 0.0073 -0.0037 0.0014 
SPECIALBRANCHES -0.045 <.0001 -0.0038 0.0866 -0.0799 0.0919 -0.0427 <.0001 -0.0404 <.0001 
ENTRYYR82 -0.0206 <.0001 -0.0274 <.0001 0.04255 0.4942 -0.02 <.0001 -0.0122 <.0001 
ENTRYYR83 -0.068 <.0001 0.02774 <.0001 0.45955 <.0001 -0.0678 <.0001 -0.0769 <.0001 
ENTRYYR84 -0.037 <.0001 -0.0019 0.5195 0.36821 <.0001 -0.0347 <.0001 -0.0187 <.0001 
ENTRYYR85 -0.0514 <.0001 -0.0448 <.0001 -0.0082 0.8885 -0.0506 <.0001 -0.0597 <.0001 
ENTRYYR86 -0.0547 <.0001 -0.0516 <.0001 -0.0473 0.3436 -0.0539 <.0001 -0.0623 <.0001 
ENTRYYR87 -0.0678 <.0001 -0.0812 <.0001 -0.149 0.0025 -0.0679 <.0001 -0.0722 <.0001 
ENTRYYR88 -0.0789 <.0001 -0.0943 <.0001 -0.225 <.0001 -0.079 <.0001 -0.0774 <.0001 
ENTRYYR89 -0.1527 <.0001 -0.1694 <.0001 0.24045 0.0006 -0.1531 <.0001 -0.1558 <.0001 
ENTRYYR90 -0.2046 <.0001 -0.1967 <.0001 2.07581 <.0001 -0.205 <.0001 -0.2167 <.0001 
ENTRYYR91 -0.2135 <.0001 -0.108 <.0001 3.32502 <.0001 -0.1976 <.0001 -0.1808 0.1355 
ENTRYYR92 -0.1478 <.0001 -0.0941 0.0024 3.51501 <.0001 -0.1381 <.0001 -0.0832 0.0002 
ENTRYYR93 -0.113 0.9273 0.17079 0.9805 18.2217 0.9989 -0.0943 0.9675 0.00377 0.9999 
ENTRYYR94 -0.2188 0.8627 0.05721 0.9935 18.1177 0.9989 -0.1997 0.9333 -0.1026 0.9967 
ENTRYYR95 -0.3311 0.7772 -0.0709 0.992 18.0366 0.9989 -0.3098 0.8986 -0.2173 0.9923 
Source: Author 
 
The log likelihoods for the five different models are shown in Table 24. If chi-
square statistics are calculated using these log likelihoods, as explained in the retention 
analysis section of this chapter, then the results seen in Table 25 are obtained. The 
exponential and Weibull models are rejected, and the Log-logistic model is rejected as  
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well. Both the log-normal and gamma models appear to fit the data very well. The results 
on Table 23 illustrate that the log-normal and gamma distributions produce 
approximately the same results.   
 
Table 24.   Log Likelihoods of All Distributions (Promotion Model)  








Table 25.   Chi-Square Statistics within Nested Models (Promotion Model) 
Comparison Chi-Square 
Exponential vs. Weibull 39748.84 
Exponential vs. Gamma 42372.30 
Weibull vs. Gamma 2623.46 
Log-Normal vs. Gamma 16.82 
Log-Logistic vs. Gamma 1513.59 
Source: Author 
In order to be sure of the model fit, the graphical method is also used for the 
selection of the appropriate distribution. Figures 50 through 54 plot the residuals for all 
distributions. As seen in the figures, the log-normal and gamma models fit the data better 
than the other distributions. Based on the results of both methods, the gamma distribution 







































Figure 54.   Residual Plot - Retention Model (Log – logistic Distribution) 
 
Table 26 displays the results of the LIFEREG procedure for the gamma 
distribution. The Effect column in the table is produced by using the Estimate column in 
the same table, and it shows the effect of variables in percentage points.  
The results show that both master’s and professional level education have 
negative effects on the time to promotion for Army officers. The effect of a master’s 
degree is significant at the 0.05 level and that of professional degree is significant at all 
usual levels, as seen in the table (p-values). The expected time for promotion to O-4 for 
an officer with a master’s degree is 0.21 percent less than that for an officer who has only 
a baccalaureate degree, accounting for other covariates, and the expected time for 
promotion to major for an officer with a professional degree is 2.43 percent less.  
For the demographic variables, being female, belonging to the other race category 
(compared to white), and each additional year of age at entry decrease the time to 
promotion to O-4, whereas being black increases it, compared to a white officer. The 
coefficients of the female, entry age and black variables are significant at all usual levels.  
However, the coefficient of the other race variable is significant at 0.05 level. The 
expected time for promotion to major for a female officer is 0.52 percent less than that of 
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a male officer, ceteris paribus. Each additional year in age at entry decreases the 
promotion time to O-4 by 0.14 percent, other things being equal. The expected promotion 
time to major for black officers is 0.50 percent higher than that of white officers, and the 
expected promotion time to major for officers of other races is 0.58 percent shorter than 
that of white officers, controlling for other factors. Being Hispanic and being married 
have no significant effect on promotion time of officers. 
 
Table 26.   Results of Gamma Distribution (Promotion Model) 
Variable Estimate Effect (%) Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept 2.6002  233667.631 <.0001
GRADUATEDEGREE -0.0021245 -0.21222 4.8786 0.0272
PROFESSIONALDEGREE -0.02465 -2.43487 29.1801 <.0001
FEMALE -0.0052296 -0.52159 10.937 0.0009
MARRIED -0.0014434 -- 1.0806 0.2986
ENTRYAGE -0.0014293 -0.14283 40.0565 <.0001
BLACK 0.0049434 0.49556 10.3298 0.0013
HISPANIC 0.0013642 -- 0.1407 0.7076
OTHERRACE -0.0057829 -0.57662 4.8071 0.0283
ROTCSCHOLAR 0.0007377 -- 0.213 0.6444
ROTCNONSCHOLAR 0.0005409 -- 0.1664 0.6833
OTHERSOURCE -0.01013 -1.00789 29.5805 <.0001
PREENLIST -0.0064971 -0.64760 26.1305 <.0001
COMBATSUPPORT 0.003684 0.36908 4.7016 0.0301
COMBATSERVICESUPPORT -0.0041051 -0.40967 7.2003 0.0073
SPECIALBRANCHES -0.04272 -4.18204 495.4733 <.0001
Source: Author 
 
Commissioning source variables have no statistically significant effect on 
promotion time to major for officers, with the exception of OTHERSOURCE.  The 
expected promotion time to O-4 for officers commissioned through other sources is 1.01 
percent less than for USMA graduates, ceteris paribus. The coefficient of 
OTHERSOURCE is significant at all usual levels. Officers who have served as enlisted 
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personnel before being commissioned have 0.65 percent shorter promotion time to major 
than those who have not, and this result is significant at 0.01 level.  
While serving in the combat support category increases promotion time to O-4, 
serving in the combat service support or special branch categories decreases promotion 
time to O-4, when compared to officers serving in the combat arms category. The 
expected promotion time to O-4 for an officer serving in the combat support field is 0.37 
percent more than that of an officer serving in the combat arms fields. On the other hand, 
the expected promotion time to major for an officer serving in the combat service support 
category is 0.41 percent less. For an officer serving in special branches, it is 4.18 percent 
less than that of an officer serving in the combat arms field, controlling for other factors. 
The coefficient of the COMBATSUPPORT variable is significant at the 0.05 level. The 
coefficients of COMBATSERVICESUPPORT and SPECIALBRANCHES are 
significant at all usual levels. 
3. Results of Estimating Cox Regression Models 
The test results for the global null hypothesis that all of the coefficients are equal 
to zero (the explanatory variables have no effect on the promotion of officers) are given 
in Table 27.  All of the test results have p-values of less than 0.0001, showing that at least 
one of the coefficients is not equal to zero. 
 
Table 27.   Global Test Statistics for the Promotion Model for the Null Hypothesis that 
All Coefficients are Equal to Zero 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 3014.196 29 <.0001 
Score 5105.179 29 <.0001 
Wald 3387.34 29 <.0001 
      Source: Author 
Table 28 displays the results of the PHREG procedure.  Having a master’s degree 
has a positive effect on the promotion of officers. An officer with a master’s degree has a 
hazard of promotion that is 115.3 percent of that of an officer with a college degree (base 
case) (15.3 % more), controlling for the other variables. This shows that attending a 
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graduate school and obtaining a master’s degree increases the probability of promotion to 
major by 15.3 percent when compared to a college graduate. The associated p-value is 
less than 0.0001, indicating that this result is significant at all usual levels. On the other 
hand, having a professional degree has no effect on the hazard of promotion of officers.  
Being female and married both have a positive effect on the promotion of Army 
officers, whereas being black has a negative effect (compared to being white), and those 
results are significant at all usual levels. The hazard of promotion to O-4 for a female 
officer is 116.5 percent of that of a male officer, ceteris paribus. A married Army officer 
has a hazard of promotion to major that is 115.6 percent of that of a single Army officer, 
when controlling for the other factors. A black officer has a hazard of promotion to O-4 
that is 80.2 percent of that of a white officer, other things being equal. Age at entry, being 
Hispanic and being of another race have no significant effect on the hazard of promotion 
for officers.  
Commissioning sources have no significant effect on the hazard of promotion for 
Army officers, with the exception of other source. Officers who have been commissioned 
through other sources have a hazard of promotion to major that is 110.5 percent of that of 
USMA graduates, ceteris paribus, and this effect is significant at the 0.05 level. Officers 
who have been enlisted before being commissioned have a higher hazard of promotion to 
major than those who had not. These officers have a hazard of promotion to major that is 
110.2 percent of that of officers who were not enlisted members before being 









Table 28.   Results of the PHREG Procedure for the Promotion Model 
 Variable Estimate
Standard 
Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Hazard 
Ratio
GRADUATEDEGREE 0.14261 0.02539 31.5354 <.0001 1.153
PROFESSIONALDEGREE 0.04259 0.11406 0.1394 0.7088 1.044
FEMALE 0.15264 0.04057 14.1528 0.0002 1.165
MARRIED 0.14486 0.03728 15.0998 0.0001 1.156
ENTRYAGE 0.00904 0.00572 2.5011 0.1138 1.009
BLACK -0.22028 0.04176 27.8233 <.0001 0.802
HISPANIC -0.14601 0.09926 2.1636 0.1413 0.864
OTHERRACE 0.00642 0.07012 0.0084 0.927 1.006
ROTCSCHOLAR -0.04569 0.04204 1.1812 0.2771 0.955
ROTCNONSCHOLAR -0.05304 0.03567 2.2109 0.137 0.948
OTHERSOURCE 0.09943 0.04909 4.1016 0.0428 1.105
PREENLIST 0.0975 0.03439 8.038 0.0046 1.102
COMBATSUPPORT -0.06626 0.04505 2.1627 0.1414 0.936
COMBATSERVICESUPPORT -0.02582 0.04106 0.3955 0.5294 0.975
SPECIALBRANCHES 0.49981 0.04681 113.982 <.0001 1.648
ENTRYYR82 0.31169 0.06233 25.0097 <.0001 1.366
ENTRYYR83 1.28722 0.0923 194.483 <.0001 3.623
ENTRYYR84 0.46009 0.06619 48.3132 <.0001 1.584
ENTRYYR85 0.82923 0.05888 198.325 <.0001 2.292
ENTRYYR86 0.85914 0.05053 289.032 <.0001 2.361
ENTRYYR87 1.19942 0.05159 540.439 <.0001 3.318
ENTRYYR88 1.61881 0.05067 1020.65 <.0001 5.047
ENTRYYR89 3.93556 0.08403 2193.63 <.0001 51.191
ENTRYYR90 4.91107 0.24938 387.812 <.0001 135.784
ENTRYYR91 1.35657 0.50364 7.2552 0.0071 3.883
ENTRYYR92 1.19826 0.70989 2.8492 0.0914 3.314
ENTRYYR93 -3.79426 210.104 0.0003 0.9856 0.022
ENTRYYR94 -3.95395 583.775 0 0.9946 0.019
ENTRYYR95 -4.02544 1227 0 0.9974 0.018
Source: Author 
While serving in the special branches field has a positive effect on the hazard of 
promotion for Army officers, serving in combat support or combat service support has no 
statistically significant effect on the hazard of promotion to O-4, compared with serving 
in the combat arms branch. Officers in the special branches category have a hazard of 
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promoting to major that is 164.8 percent of that of officers in combat arms, controlling 
for other factors. The coefficient of the SPECIALBRANCHES variable is significant at 
all usual levels.  
The coefficients of the commissioning year variables are all significant with the 
exception of the FY 1993, FY 1994 and FY 1995 variables. In general, the hazard of 
promotion increases with commissioning year. 
C. COMPARISON OF HYPOTHESIZED AND OBSERVED EFFECTS  
This study focuses mainly on the effects of advanced education on the retention 
and promotion of Army officers; however, it also analyzes some other factors that may 
affect retention and promotion.  
Survival analysis is used as an empirical approach in order to evaluate the effects 
of explanatory variables on retention and promotion. Survival analysis gives not only the 
partial effects of variables on the probability of separation or promotion, but also the 
effects on the time that it takes until separation or promotion occurs. The LIFEREG 
procedure gives the results for the survival function, which shows the effect of a variable 
on the time until the event occurs. The PHREG procedure gives the results for the hazard 
function, which produces partial effects on the probability of occurrence of the events. 
This section compares the hypothesized and actual effects of variables for each 
independent variable. The tables include the effects estimated with the LIFEREG and 
PHREG procedures in SAS software.  
The sign in the LIFEREG column shows the direction of the effect on time to the 
event. Thus, for retention analysis, a positive sign indicates that the variable increases the 
service time (survival time). However, for promotion analysis, it shows that the variable 
increases the time to promotion to major. The sign in the PHREG column shows the 
effect of a variable on the occurrence of separation or promotion; that is, a positive sign 
indicates that the hazard of separation or promotion is greater than for the base case (for a 
binary variable), and a negative sign indicates that the variable decreases the hazard of 
separation or promotion when compared to the base case. If the variable is continuous, 
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then the sign of the coefficient in the PHREG results shows the direction of the effect of 
each additional unit increase in the variable on the hazard of separation or promotion. 
The signs of the continuous variables in the LIFEREG procedure results indicate the 
direction of the effect of each one unit increase in that variable on the service or 
promotion time of an officer in percentage points.  
1. Education Variables 
One hypothesis related to the education variables was that the survival functions 
of officers would differ with the education level for both retention and promotion. Results 
of the LIFETEST procedure show that survival functions of officers differ with their 
education levels for both the retention and promotion models, and these findings are 
significant at all usual levels using the log-rank, Wilcoxon, and likelihood-ratio tests.  
Another hypothesis related to education levels of officers was that any type of 
advanced education would have a positive effect on both retention and promotion. The 
results summarized in Table 29 show that all types of advanced education have a positive 
effect on survival times and a negative effect on the hazard of separation of officers for 
the retention model. Thus, advanced education increases survival time of officers and 
decreases the hazard of separation when compared to baccalaureate degree only..  
 
Table 29.    Hypothesized and Observed Effects of Education Variables 
  Retention   Promotion  
Variable  Findings   Findings  
 Hypothesis LIFEREG PHREG Hypothesis LIFEREG PHREG 
GRADUATEDEGREE + +*** -*** + -** +***
DOCTORATEDEGREE + +*** -*** + N/A N/A 
PROFESSIONAL 
DEGREE 
+ +*** -*** + -*** + 
COLLEGEDEGREE   BASE CASE   
*     Significant at 0.10 level 
**     Significant at 0.05 level 
***  Significant at 0.01 level 




For the promotion model, the doctorate degree holders are combined with the 
master’s degree holders for survival analysis. As seen in Table 29, a graduate degree 
decreases the time for promotion to major and increases the hazard of promotion to O-4. 
However, although a professional degree decreases the time for promotion to major, it 
has no significant effect on the hazard of being promoted to major. For both the retention 
and promotion models, the hypothesized and observed effects of the education variables 
are the same, with the exception of the effect of a professional degree on the hazard of 
promotion, which has no significant effect.  
2. Demographic Variables 
Table 30 summarizes the hypothesized and observed effects of demographic 
variables on retention and promotion. As hypothesized, being female decreases service 
time and increases the hazard of separation. However, as opposed to the hypothesis, 
being female decreases the time for promotion to O-4 and increases the hazard of being 
promoted to major. There are some studies in the literature that found similar results. 
Branigan (2001), for example, found that female officers were more likely to be selected 
for promotion to O-5.118 Buterbaugh (1995), Wielsma (1996) and Kabalar (2003) all 
found that gender had no significant effect on promotion.  
Being married has the expected effect, which is that it increases service time and 
the hazard of promotion to O-4, and decreases the hazard of leaving the service, when 
compared to single officers. However, being married has no significant effect on time for 
promotion to major. 
Age at entry has unexpected results for the retention model and the expected 
results for the promotion model. Each additional year in age at entry decreases service 
time and time to promotion to O-4, and increases the hazards of separation and promotion 
to major. This result may be attributable to the fact that officers who are older at entry 
may have more difficulty in adapting to military life and prefer leaving the service 
earlier. However, those older entrants who decided to stay in the Army may have found 
                                                 
118 Gregory A.Branigan, “The Effect of Graduate Education on the Retention and Promotion of 
Marine Corps Officers,” (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2001), 1. 
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the military to be the job best matching their characteristics and expectations after 
spending several years in the civilian labor market. They may therefore be more 
productive and promotable. In addition, prior enlisted officers are older at entry into 
commissioned service than those with no prior service, and they need to serve a shorter 
time as officers to be eligible for retirement. 
 
Table 30.   Hypothesized and Observed Effects of Demographic Variables 
  Retention   Promotion  
Variable  Findings   Findings  
 Hypothesis LIFEREG PHREG Hypothesis LIFEREG PHREG 
FEMALE - -*** +*** - -*** +***
MARRIED + +*** -*** + - +***
ENTRYAGE + -*** +*** + -*** +
BLACK + +*** -*** - +*** -***
HISPANIC + +*** -*** - + -
OTHER RACE + +*** -*** - -** +
WHITE  BASE CASE  
*     Significant at 0.10 level 
**     Significant at 0.05 level 
***  Significant at 0.01 level 
      
Source: Author 
The race/ethnicity variables have the expected results, with the exception of the 
effect of OTHERRACE on promotion time. As hypothesized, being a member of a 
minority group increases service time and decreases the hazard of separation, when 
compared to the base case, which is a white officer. Being black significantly increases 
the time for promotion to O-4 and decreases the hazard of being promoted to major, 
compared to a white officer. Being a member of the other race group decreases time for 
promotion to O-4; however, it has no significant effect on the hazard of being promoted 
to O-4. Being Hispanic has no effect on promotion. This result is similar to some of the 
previous studies. Buterbaugh (1995), Wielsma (1996), Kizilkaya (2004) and Perry (2006) 




3. Commissioning Source Variables 
The commissioning source variables have unexpected results. All commissioning 
source variables, with the exception of ROTCSCHOLAR, increase service time 
compared to an Academy graduate, which is the opposite of the hypothesized effect.  
Furthermore, all commissioning source variables decrease the hazard of separation when 
compared to Academy graduates. Having been commissioned through a source other than 
the three major sources decreases the time for promotion to O-4 and increases the hazard 
of being promoted to major. Having been commissioned through ROTC, with or without 
a scholarship, has no effect on promotion. 
Fagan (2001) found that OCS graduates (represented in the OTHERSOURCE 
group in this study) are more productive and successful on the job.119 Kizilkaya (2004) 
found that Academy graduates are more likely to leave the Army120 than officers from 
other commissioning sources, which is similar to the findings of this study. Furthermore, 
he found that Academy graduates were less likely to be promoted to major than those 
from other sources, and that OCS graduates had the highest promotion probabilities121, 
which is the same result as in this study.  In addition, Mitchell et al. (2000) found in an 
analysis of survey data that officers commissioned through the USMA are less likely to 
plan to stay than those commissioned through any other source.122 The researchers stated 
that the reason for low retention might be the fact that there were differences between 
what the officers were taught in the Academy and what they actually experienced in the 
field. Another reason suggested was that Academy graduates may have more 
opportunities in the civilian sector than other officers, since they receive a highly 
selective military academy education. 
                                                 
119 Billy K.Fagan, “Analysis Of Determinants Of Training Performance, Retention, And Promotion 
To Lieutenant Commander Of Naval Flight Officers,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, 2002). 
120 Zafer Kizilkaya, “An Analysis of the Effect of Commissioning Sources on Retention and 
Promotion of U.S. Army Officers,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 
2004). 
121 Ibid. 
122 D. Mitchell et al., “Predictors of US Army Captain Retention Decisions,” quoted in Zafer 
Kizilkaya, “An Analysis of the Effect of Commissioning Sources on Retention and Promotion of U.S. 
Army Officers,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2004). 
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Table 31.   Hypothesized and Observed Effects of Commissioning Source Variables 
  Retention   Promotion  
Variable  Findings   Findings  
 Hypothesis LIFEREG PHREG Hypothesis LIFEREG PHREG 
ROTCSCHOLAR - - -*** - + -
ROTCNONSCHOLAR - +*** -*** - + -
OTHERSOURCE - +*** -*** - -*** +**
ACADEMY  BASE CASE  
*     Significant at 0.10 level 
**     Significant at 0.05 level 
***  Significant at 0.01 level 
      
Source: Author 
 
Finally, Doganca (2006) found that ROTC non-scholarship and OCS graduates 
(represented in the OTHERSOURCE group in this study) have lower hazards of leaving 
than USMA graduates.123 According to Doganca, most OCS officers have served as 
enlisted and may have more realistic expectations about the military since they are more 
familiar with the Army. This may lead to longer service for the OCS graduates compared 
to USMA graduates.  
4. Prior Enlistment Status Variable 
It has been hypothesized that serving as an enlisted service member before being 
commissioned as an officer would have a positive effect on both retention and promotion 
of officers. That is, prior enlisted officers were expected to stay in the Army for longer 
periods and be more likely to be promoted to O-4. The findings of this study support this 
hypothesis. Officers who have been enlisted before being commissioned have longer 
service times and shorter promotion times. In addition, being prior enlisted increases the 
hazard of being promoted and decreases the hazard of leaving the service. 
5. Military Occupational Specialty Variables 
Military occupational specialties have the expected results for the retention 
model, and all LIFEREG and PHREG results for the combat service support field and 
                                                 
123 Erkan Doganca, “Officer Career Paths and the Effects of Commissioning Sources on the Survival 
Patterns of Army Officers,", (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2006). 
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special branches are significant at the usual levels. The combat support field variable is 
significant at the 0.10 level for the LIFEREG procedure for the retention model. As 
hypothesized, serving in one of the fields other than combat arms decreases service time 
in the Army and increases the hazard of leaving the service, when compared to a combat 
arms officer.  
For the promotion model, the results differ according to the MOS category. 
Combat support officers have longer promotion times to O-4, whereas combat service 
support and special branch officers have shorter times, when compared to officers serving 
in the combat arms field.  Serving in the special branches increases the hazard of being 
promoted to major. However, serving in the combat support or combat service support 
categories has no significant effect on the hazard of being promoted. The Army’s needs 
are an important factor in promotion, as explained earlier. The promotion probability 
among different military occupational specialties may differ because the Army may need 
a greater portion of officers serving in a given category to be promoted to O-4. For 
example, the Army may need a higher proportion of majors in the special branches 
(doctors, lawyers etc.) category than in other categories, which in turn causes the officers 
serving in that category to have higher rates of promotion to major and shorter times to be 
promoted to O-4. This may be one reason that special branch officers are more likely to 
be promoted to major in shorter periods than combat arms officers. 
 
Table 32.   Hypothesized and Observed Effects of Occupational Specialty Variables 
  Retention   Promotion  
Variable  Findings   Findings  
 Hypothesis LIFEREG PHREG Hypothesis LIFEREG PHREG 
COMBATSUPPORT  - -* +*** - +** -
COMBATSERVICESUPPORT  - -*** +*** - -*** -
SPECIALBRANCHES - -*** +*** - -*** +***
COMBATARMS BASE CASE  
*     Significant at 0.10 level 
**     Significant at 0.05 level 
***  Significant at 0.01 level 




D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter uses survival analysis techniques to estimate the effect of education 
level and some other characteristics of Army officers on retention and promotion. In 
general, results show that advanced education has a positive effect on both retention and 
promotion. Advanced education increases the hazard of being promoted to major and 
service time as an officer, and it decreases the hazard of separation and promotion time to 
O-4. One exception is that having a professional degree has no significant effect on the 
hazard of being promoted to major. 
Being married, being a minority, being commissioned through ROTC non-
scholarship or other source, and being prior enlisted increase service time in the Army; 
whereas being female and serving in any military occupational field other than combat 
arms decreases service time. Furthermore, while female officers, prior enlisted officers, 
officers of other race, officers commissioned through other sources and officers serving 
in combat service support or special branch fields have shorter promotion times to major, 
black officers and officers serving in combat support fields have longer promotion times 
to O-4. 
Being female or serving in any occupational category other than combat arms 
increases the hazard of leaving. On the other hand, being married, being a minority, 
having served as enlisted or being commissioned through any source other than USMA 
decreases the hazard of separation.  Female officers, officers commissioned through other 
sources, prior enlisted officers, and officers serving in the special branches are more 
likely to be promoted. Being black decreases the hazard of being promoted to major.   
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The main focus of this study is the effect of advanced education on the retention 
and promotion of Army officers. Four variables for highest level of education are used 
for the retention model - college degree (baccalaureate), master’s degree, doctorate, and 
professional degree. For the promotion model, three educational levels are used - college 
degree, master’s degree or doctorate and professional degree. Since the number of 
doctorate holders is too few in the promotion sample, they are combined with master’s 
degree holders. In general, results show that having an advanced education degree 
increases the service time of Army officers and the hazard of being promoted to major. 
Furthermore, results show that advanced education decreases the hazard of leaving the 
Army and the time to promotion to major. 
Survival analysis is used as an empirical approach in order to estimate the models. 
Survival analysis not only provides the partial effects of variables on the probability of 
separation or promotion but also the effects on the time that it takes until separation or 
promotion occurs. Three methods of survival analysis are used for the analysis-- survival 
pattern analysis, parametric regression models and Cox (non-parametric) regression 
models. 
For survival pattern analysis, the life-table method is used, because the data set is 
too large to use Kaplan-Meier method which gives survival pattern results for each 
individual in the data set. The life-table method yields results from grouping the 
observations into time intervals. Both methods give the probability that a person will 
survive until the time t+1, given that he or she has survived until the time t. Both 
methods also provide the probability of not surviving (separate or not promote) during 
the same time frame. 124 The life-table method produces estimates and plots of the hazard 
function.125 The survival and hazard functions of all officers in the data set and of 
                                                 
124 Allison, 29-41. 
125 Ibid., 41. 
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officers with different education levels are plotted in order to observe service time and 
promotion time patterns. Plotting the survival and hazard functions of officers with 
different education levels shows the differences in both service time and time to 
promotion to O-4, according to their educational level. 
Parametric models for duration produce results that show the effects of 
explanatory variables on survival times. That is, for binary variables, they produce the 
estimated mean difference in survival times for two groups, and for continuous variables, 
they give the percent increase (decrease) in the estimated survival time for each one unit 
increase in the variable.126  Thus, parametric models show the service time differences 
for retention analysis, and the time differences in time to promotion to major for 
promotion analysis.  
Cox regression models (nonparametric models for event outcomes) provide the 
results for the hazard function which produces partial effects on the probability of 
occurrence of the events. Thus, for the retention model used in this thesis, they provide 
the effects of independent variables on the hazard of separation of Army officers.  For the 
promotion model, they show the effects of explanatory variables on the hazard of being 
promoted to major. 
Three SAS software procedures are used in order to find the survival and hazard 
functions of officers for retention and promotion. PROC LIFETEST is used for survival 
pattern analysis, PROC LIFEREG is used for estimating parametric models for duration 
analysis and PROC PHREG is used for estimating Cox regression results (nonparametric 
models for event occurrences). The PROC LIFETEST procedure is useful for preliminary 
analysis and plotting the survival and hazard functions. Furthermore, PROC LIFETEST 
shows the differences in these functions between groups. PROC LIFEREG is used to find 
the effect of explanatory variables on duration. PROC PHREG produces the partial effect 
of variables on hazard function. 
 
                                                 
126 Allison, 65. 
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1. Retention Analysis 
Results of analysis of the survival and hazard functions show that there is an 
increase in separation rates between years 4 and 6 which marks the end of the initial 
service obligation of officers, depending on their commissioning sources. Then there is 
another increase in hazard function between years 12 and 14, which is the point for both 
promotion to major and the end of service obligation related to graduate education. 
Finally, the sharpest decrease in service time (survival function) and the sharpest increase 
in the hazard function for separation occur in the twentieth year, which is the year when 
officers are eligible for retirement.  
Results of the log-rank, Wilcoxon, and likelihood-ratio tests show that survival 
functions differ significantly with the level of education. College graduates have the 
lowest survival function, whereas the officers with master’s degrees have the highest 
survival function.  
Results of the LIFEREG procedure show the effect of independent variables on 
the duration time until the event (separation) occurs. Table 33 summarizes results of the 
LIFEREG procedure for the retention model. Since the gamma distribution fits the data 
best, results of that distribution are displayed on the table. The percentage effects are 
calculated and presented in the LIFEREG (EFFECT) column. The signs of coefficients in 
the LIFEREG column show the direction of the effect of a variable on the survival 
function or service time.  The numbers in the table show the percentage effect of that 
variable when compared to the base case for binary variables, and for each additional one 
unit increase for continuous variables.  
The results of the LIFEREG procedure show that all types of advanced education 
have positive effects on the retention of Army officers. The expected survival time of an 
officer with a master’s degree is 29.13 percent greater than that of an officer who has 
only a baccalaureate degree, accounting for other covariates. The expected survival time 
of an officer with a doctorate degree is 23.94 percent greater than that of an officer who 
has only a baccalaureate degree, and the expected survival time of an officer with a 
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professional degree is 8.21 percent greater than that of an officer who has only a 
baccalaureate degree, accounting for other covariates. 
 









EDUCATION VARIABLES  












COMMISSIONING SOURCE  




PRIOR ENLISTMENT    STATUS  
PREENLIST 5.40*** 0.811***
MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY  




*     Significant at 0.10 level 
**     Significant at 0.05 level 
***  Significant at 0.01 level 





Other findings of the LIFEREG procedure are as follows: 
• Female officers have shorter service times than male officers. 
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• Being married, being in a minority group and being prior enlisted increase 
service time. 
• An increase in the entry age has a negative effect on survival time. 
• Officers commissioned through ROTC non-scholarship and through 
sources other than USMA, ROTC scholarship and ROTC nonscholarship have longer 
survival times than USMA graduates. 
• Being commissioned through the ROTC scholarship program 
(ROTCSCHOLAR) has no significant effect on service time compared to an Academy 
graduate.  
• Officers in the combat arms field have longer service times than those in 
other branches. 
Results of the PHREG procedure are also presented in Table 33. The hazard ratios 
of all of the education variables are less than one, indicating that the hazard of leaving the 
service for officers with advanced education degrees is less than that of college graduates. 
An officer with a master’s degree has a hazard of leaving that is 38.3 percent of that of an 
officer with just a college degree (base case) (61.7 percent less), controlling for the other 
variables.  The hazard of separation for an officer with a doctorate degree is 55.6 percent 
less than that of an officer with a college degree, ceteris paribus. An officer with a 
professional degree has a hazard of leaving the service that is 75.6 percent of that of a 
college graduate, when controlling for other factors.  
Other findings of the PHREG PROCEDURE are as follows: 
• Female officers and officers serving in occupational categories other than 
combat arms have higher hazards of separation than males and combat arms officers. 
• Married officers, minorities, officers commissioned through any source 
other than USMA, and prior enlisted officers have lower hazards of leaving the Army. 
• Each year increase in the age at entry increases the hazard of separating. 
2. Promotion Analysis 
The survival function in the promotion model shows how long it takes to be 
promoted to major. The survival function is flat until the tenth year, indicating that almost 
 148
no one is promoted during that time. Then, it begins to decrease gradually until the 
twelfth year, indicating that a small number of officers are promoted during that time. 
The function then decreases sharply until the fourteenth year, highlighting the period 
during which most officers are promoted to major. Then, it gradually declines until the 
seventeenth year, which is the last year when officers are promoted to O-4 in the sample. 
After that year, the value of the function is zero, showing that no one is promoted.  
Analysis of the hazard function yields the same results. The hazard of being 
promoted to O-4 begins to increase slightly at about the tenth year. There is a sharp 
increase in the hazard of promotion after the twelfth year. Then it begins to decline at the 
thirteenth year. There is a small increase in the sixteenth year, indicating that the hazard 
of promotion increases slightly during that year. It then declines and becomes zero at year 
17, again showing that no promotions to O-4 occur after that time, as for the survivor 
function. 
According to results of the log-rank, Wilcoxon, and likelihood-ratio tests, the 
survival (promotion) functions of officers differ significantly according to their education 
levels. Test results are significant at all usual levels. 
Survival functions for officers with different education levels for promotion 
analysis show that professional degree holders have the lowest survival curve, indicating 
that those officers are promoted in shorter times than the other categories. Master’s 
degree holders and college graduates have very similar survival functions, indicating that 
their promotion time to O-4 is almost equal. However, analysis of hazard functions based 
on education level clearly shows that the promotion hazards of officers with or without 
master’s degrees do differ. The sharpest increase in the hazard function (hazard of being 
promoted to major) is observed for officers who have master’s degrees. 
Results of the LIFEREG and PHREG procedures for the promotion model are 
summarized in Table 34. The signs of coefficients in the LIFEREG column show the 
direction of the effect of a variable on the time that it takes to be promoted to O-4. A 
positive sign indicates that the variable increases promotion time when compared to the 
base case, for binary variables. If the variable is continuous, it shows the increase in time 
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that it takes to be promoted when this variable is increased by one unit. The number in 
the effect column shows the percentage effect of that variable when compared to the base 
case for binary variables, and the percentage effect of each additional unit increase for 
continuous variables.  
 









EDUCATION VARIABLES  
COLLEGEDEGREE BASE  
GRADUATEDEGREE -0.21** 1.153***
PROFESSIONALDEGREE -2.43*** -- 
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES  
FEMALE -0.52*** 1.165***
MARRIED -- 1.156***
ENTRYAGE -0.14*** -- 
WHITE BASE  
BLACK 0.50*** 0.802***
HISPANIC -- -- 
OTHERRACE -0.58** -- 
COMMISSIONING SOURCE  
ACADEMY BASE  
ROTCSCHOLAR -- -- 
ROTCNONSCHOLAR -- -- 
OTHERSOURCE -1.01*** 1.105**
PRIOR ENLISTMENT    STATUS  
PREENLIST -0.65*** 1.102***
MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY  
COMBATARMS BASE  
COMBATSUPPORT 0.37** -- 
COMBATSERVICESUPPORT -0.41*** -- 
SPECIALBRANCHES -4.18*** 1.648***
*     Significant at 0.10 level 
**     Significant at 0.05 level 
***  Significant at 0.01 level 






As seen in Table 34, advanced education decreases the time for promotion to 
major. The expected time for promotion to O-4 for an officer with a master’s degree is 
0.21 percent less than that for an officer who has only a baccalaureate degree, accounting 
for other covariates. The expected time for promotion to major for an officer with a 
professional degree is 2.43 percent less than that for an officer who has only a 
baccalaureate degree, accounting for other covariates. Other findings of the LIFEREG 
procedure are as follows: 
• Female officers, officers of other race, officers commissioned through 
other sources, prior enlistees, and officers in combat service support  and special 
branches have shorter promotion times than  officers who are male, white, USMA 
graduates, nonprior enlistees and officers serving in combat arms, respectively. 
• Being black and serving in the combat support field increase time for 
promotion to major. 
• Officers who are younger at entry have longer times to promotion to 
major. 
• Being married, Hispanic and commissioned through ROTC (with or 
without scholarship) have no significant effect on promotion time.  
According to the PHREG results, a professional degree has no significant effect 
on the hazard of being promoted. However, a master’s degree or a doctorate degree has a 
positive effect on the hazard of being promoted. An officer with a master’s degree or a 
doctorate has a hazard of promotion that is 115.3 percent of that of an officer with a 
college degree (base case) (15.3 percent more), other things being equal. Other findings 
of the PHREG procedure are as follows: 
• Female officers, married officers, prior enlisted officers and those serving 
in special branches have higher hazards of being promoted to major than males, single 
officers, nonprior enlistees and those serving in combat arms, respectively: 
• Black officers have a lower hazard of being promoted to O-4 than whites. 
• Officers commissioned through sources other than USMA and ROTC 
(with or without scholarship) have higher hazards of being promoted to O-4 than USMA 
graduates. 
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• Entry age, being Hispanic or other race, being commissioned through 
ROTC (with or without scholarship), and serving in the combat support or combat service 
support categories have no significant effect on the hazard of being promoted to the grade 
of O-4. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Human capital theory suggests that when workers make investments in education 
and training, the expected returns are higher future earnings, increased job satisfaction 
over their lifetimes, and other quality of life improvements. Results of this study show 
that officers with advanced education are more likely to be retained and are also more 
likely to be promoted to major, which corroborates human capital theory.  
Results of this study indicate that officers with advanced education degrees (those 
who made an investment in education) have longer service times than officers who did 
not invest in advanced education and are less likely to leave the Army. This result may be 
interpreted as an indicator that advanced education leads to increased job satisfaction 
among officers over their lifetimes as a result of investing in advanced education and 
contributes to their desire to remain in the Army. 
In the Army compensation differs according to an officer’s rank. Thus, if an 
officer is promoted more rapidly, then he or she increases his or her earnings. The 
results of this thesis about the relationship of Army officer promotion and level of 
education  are  similar to those found in the literature, including Buterbaugh (1995), 
Wielsma (1996), Bowman and Mehay (1998), Branigan (2001) , Kabalar (2003) and 
Kizilkaya (2004). All of these studies found that advanced education has a positive effect 
on officer promotion. This thesis also finds that possessing an advanced degree 
significantly decreases the time for promotion to major and increases the probability of 
being promoted to O-4 for Army officers. Thus, acquiring advanced education benefits 
these officers by increasing their earnings, as predicted by human capital theory. 
Another explanation for the higher earnings of those with more education is the 
concept of education as a signal. If those who have lower costs of acquiring education are 
also of higher ability and are more productive on the job, then educational level serves as 
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a useful signal for employers in screening for employment and promotion.127 The results 
of this study are also consistent with this approach. Army officers who obtain advanced 
education are found to be more likely to be promoted and are promoted more quickly 
than those who have not acquired these degrees. Thus, advanced degrees may serve as 
signals to the Army (the employer) regarding officers' superior abilities and productivity.  
C.  LIMITATIONS 
Although the data set includes information on more than 100,000 officers, only 
45,228 observations are used for retention analysis and 12,092 for promotion analysis due 
to missing and unknown values in some of the data fields.  The main focus of this study 
is the effect of education level of officers on retention and promotion. However, in the 
data set, the education level of about 90,000 officers was miscoded or was unknown. As a 
result, observations with miscoded or unknown education levels were deleted from the 
database, which substantially limited the number of officers used for analysis. 
Some variables that were used in previous studies on the effects of level of 
education on retention and/or promotion were not available in the data set and could not 
be used in the analysis. These variables include the college grade point average of an 
officer, performance reports, whether an officer separated voluntarily, the quality of the 
college from which the officer graduated, awards received, and the officer’s alma mater 
for graduate education (military or civilian). These omitted variables have the potential to 
bias some of the study’s results.   
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Improvement and Expansion of Data and Suggestions for Future 
Research 
This study mainly examines the relationship between the education level of Army 
officers and their retention decisions or their promotion to major. The data were not 
available to determine where the officers obtained their master’s or doctorate degrees. To 
find out the differences in service times and in promotion probabilities between officers 
                                                 
127 Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Robert S. Smith, Modern Labor Economics, 9th ed. (New York: Pearson 
Education, Inc, 2006), 277. 
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who obtained their degrees from a military institution such as the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) or from civilian universities would provide interesting information to the 
Army. The Army would thus be able to compare the costs and benefits of different 
educational institutions in for decision-making regarding human capital investment.  
Another extension of this analysis could be used to compare the costs and benefits 
of advanced degree programs with military training. This approach would focus on the 
promotion and service time differences between officers who received master’s degree 
from any institution, and those who had advanced training on firm-specific issues, that is, 
on military subjects. 
Identifying advanced education as fully funded, partially funded and unfunded 
and estimating the retention and promotion differences among officers who received 
different kinds of funding would also provide helpful information for the Army. 
However, for this study the data were not available to differentiate the officers according 
to their utilizing the Army funds.   
The data used for this study do not distinguish between officers who leave the 
Army voluntarily and those who leave involuntarily. More accurate conclusions about 
retention decisions might be drawn if it were possible to categorize the officers who 
separated into these two groups. 
2. Policy Recommendations 
The results of this study have important implications for Army education policy. 
Advanced education significantly increases the length of time that Army officers serve on 
active duty, and significantly decreases their probability of separation from the Army.  
Furthermore, advanced education significantly increases the likelihood of Army officers 
being promoted to the rank of O-4, and decreases the time for promotion to O-4. For 
these reasons, the Army should place great importance on the education of officers at 
advanced education institutions in order to obtain the benefits of investment in human 
capital, which, for the Army, means increased productivity and readiness. 
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APPENDIX A. DISTRIBUTION AND RETENTION RATES AS OF 
SEPTEMBER 30, 2004 FOR ALL ARMY OFFICERS ENTERING 
1981-2004 IN NUMBERS (AND PERCENT) 








VARIABLE NUMBER STAY LEAVE 
TOTAL OFFICERS 45,228(100%) 33,232(73.48%) 11,996(26.52%) 
 EDUCATION VARIABLES  
COLLEGE DEGREE 26,781(59.21%) 18,193(67.93%) 8,588(32.07%) 
MASTER’S DEGREE 13,403(29.63%) 11,577(86.38%) 1,826(13.62%) 
DOCTORATE 432(0.96%) 334(77.31%) 98(22.69%) 
PROFESSIONAL 4612(10.2%) 3,128(67.82%) 1,484(32.18%) 
 DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES  
MALE 38,147(84.34%) 28,660(75.13%) 9,487(24.87%) 
FEMALE 7,081(15.66%) 4,572(64.57%) 2,509(35.43%) 
MARRIED 33,788(74.71%) 26,104(77.0%) 7,684(23.0%) 
SINGLE 11,440(25.29%) 7,128(62.0%) 4,312(38.0%) 
WHITE 35,759(79.06%) 25,983(72.66%) 9,776(27.34%) 
BLACK 5,227(11.56%) 4,102(78.48%) 1,125(21.52%) 
HISPANIC 1,731(3.83%) 1,322(76.37%) 409(23.63%) 
OTHER RACE 2,511(5.55%) 1,825(72.68%) 686(27.32) 
 COMMISSIONING SOURCE  
USMA 7,977(17.64%) 5,455(68.38%) 2,522(31.62%) 
ROTC SCHOLAR 12,599(27.86%) 8,493(67.41%) 4,106(32.59%) 
ROTC 14,643(32.38%) 11,831(80.80%) 2,812(19.20%) 
OTHER SOURCE 10,009(22.13%) 7,453(74.46%) 2,556(25.54%) 
 PRIOR ENLISTMENT STATUS  
PRIOR ENLISTED 16,006(35.39%) 12,594((78.68%) 3,412(21.32%) 
NONPRIOR 29,222(64.61%) 20,638(70.62%) 8,584(29.38%) 
 OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY  
COMBAT ARMS 26,758(59.16%) 20,189(75.45%) 6,569(24.55%) 
COMBAT SUPPORT 3,323(7.35%) 2,365(71.17%) 958(28.83%) 
COMBAT SERVICE 5,420(11.98%) 3,967(73.19%) 1,453(26.81%) 
SPECIAL BRANCHES 9,727(21.51%) 6,711(68.99%) 3,016(31.01%) 
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APPENDIX B. DISTRIBUTION AND PROMOTION RATES TO 
MAJOR AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2004 FOR ALL ARMY OFFICERS 
ENTERING 1981-2004 IN NUMBERS (AND PERCENT) 






TOTAL OFFICERS 12,092(100%) 6,742(55.76%) 5,350(44.24%) 
 EDUCATION VARIABLES  
COLLEGE DEGREE 8,282(68.49%) 3,722(44.94%) 4,560(55.06%) 
MASTER’S DEGREE 3,698(30.58%) 2,925(79.10%) 773(20.90%) 
DOCTORATE 
DEGREE 
20(0.17%) 14(70.00%) 6(30.00%) 
PROFESSIONAL 
DEGREE 
92(0.76%) 81(88.04%) 11(11.96%) 
 DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES  
MALE 10,448(86.40%) 5,900(56.47%) 4,548(43.53%) 
FEMALE 1,644(13.60%) 842(51.22%) 802(48.78%) 
MARRIED 9,934(82.15%) 5,859(58.98%) 4,075(41.02%) 
SINGLE 2,158(17.85%) 883(40.92%) 1,275(59.08%) 
WHITE 10,156(83.99%) 5,752(56.64%) 4,404(43.36%) 
BLACK 1,320(10.92%) 673(50.98%) 647(49.02%) 
HISPANIC 215(1.78%) 105(48.84%) 110(51.16%) 
OTHER RACE 401(3.32%) 212(52.87%) 189(47.13) 
 COMMISSIONING SOURCE  
USMA 2,801(23.16%) 1,582(56.48%) 1,219(43.52%) 
ROTC SCHOLAR 2,216(18.33%) 1,119(50.50%) 1,097(49.50%) 
ROTC 
NONSCHOLAR 
5,566(46.03%) 3,117(56.00%) 2,449(44.00%) 
OTHER SOURCE 1,509(12.48%) 924(61.20%) 585(38.80%) 
 PRIOR ENLISTMENT STATUS  
PRIOR ENLISTED 2,578(21.32%) 1,393(54.03%) 1,185(45.97%) 
NONPRIOR 
ENLISTED 
9,514(78.68%) 5,349(56.22%) 4,165(43.78%) 
 OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY  
COMBAT ARMS 8,461(69.97%) 4,700(55.55%) 3,761(44.45%) 
COMBAT SUPPORT 1,080(8.93%) 582(53.89%) 498(46.11%) 
COMBAT SERVICE 
SUPPORT 
1,407(11.64%) 763(54.23%) 644(45.77%) 
SPECIAL BRANCHES 1,144(9.46%) 697(60.93%) 447(39.07%) 
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